NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 50 | Number 2

Article 1

2-1-1972

Antitrust and Unfair Trade Practice Law in North
Carolina -- Federal Law Compared
William B. Aycock

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
William B. Aycock, Antitrust and Unfair Trade Practice Law in North Carolina -- Federal Law Compared, 50 N.C. L. Rev. 199 (1972).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol50/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

1972]

ANTITRUST

ANTITRUST AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICE LAW

IN NORTH CAROLINA-FEDERAL LAW COMPAREDt
WILLIAM

B.

AYCOCK*

1. INTRODUCTION ...................................
II. A BIT OF HISTORY .................................
III. ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS OF TRADE ............
A . Tim e ............................................
B. Territory .........................................
C . Conclusion .......................................
IV. NON-ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS OF TRADE .........
A . Price Fixing ......................................
(1) Horizontal Price Fixing .........................
(2) Vertical Price Fixing ............................
(3) Conclusion on Price Fixing ......................
B. TerritorialArrangements ...........................
(1) Horizontal-Divisionof Markets .................
(2) Vertical ......................................
(a) Exclusive Selling ........................
(b) Closed Territories and Customer Limitations ...

C. Exclusive Arrangements ............................
(1) Restriction on a Buyer ..........................
(a) Exclusive Buying ...........................
(b) Requirements Contracts ....................
(c) Tying Clauses .............................
(2) Restrictions on Lessees, Licensees and Franchisees ...

200
201
.208
209 "
210
212
212
213
213
218
220
221
221
224
224
225

227
227
227
230
231
233

D. Rejusals to Deal ..................................
234
(1) Individual Refusals to Deal ......................
234
(2) Concerted Refusals to Deal ......................
235
E. Monopolization, Attempt to Monopolize, Combination or
Conspiracy to Monopolize ...........................
240
F. PricingPolicies Designedto Injure or Destroy Competitors 242
tThis article was prepared in cooperation with the North Carolina Law Center and with the
assistance of Francis R. Lawther, Jr., third year law student at the University of North Carolina

School of Law.
*Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.

NORTH CAROLINA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 50

V. UNFAIR COMPETITION, UNFAIR METHODS OF
COMPETITION, AND UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS OR
PRA CT IC ES ............................................
A. Unfiair Competition ...............................
B. Unfair Methods of Competition ......................
C. Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices in the Conduct of
Any Trade or Commerce ............................
VI. CONCLUSION ......................................
VII. APPENDIX: Chapter 75 ..............................

I.

246
248
249
251
254
256

INTRODUCTION

In North Carolina restraints of trade and unfair trade practices
were subject to judicial scrutiny under the common law even before the
enactment of antitrust legislation.' The General Assembly, in passing
antitrust legislation, did not abrogate the common law. Instead, the
common law was incorporated ino the statutory scheme. Section 75-2
of the North Carolina GeneralStatutes provides that "[a]ny act, contract, combination in the form of trust, or conspiracy in restraint of
trade or commerce which violates the principles of the common law"
also violates section 75-1 of the antitrust statute. 2 The main purpose of
this article is to deal with chapter 75 of the North Carolina General
Statutes, entitled "Monopolies, Trusts and Consumer Protection." ' In
1969 chapter 75 was expanded to include "unfair methods of competi'Culp v. Love, 127 N.C. 457, 37 S.E. 476 (1900); Smith v. Morganton Ice Co., 159 N.C. 151,
74 S.E. 961 (1912) (violation of common law and the antitrust statute); State v. Craft, 168 N.C.
208, 83 S.E. 772 (1914) (conviction under common law for conspiracy to fix the price of milk). In
Craft neither the solicitor nor the trial judge was aware of an antitrust statute, although the first
such statute had been passed twenty-five years before the trial of this case. Id. at 214, 83 S.E. at
775. See S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS: CASES AND CONIMENTS 8 (3d
ed. 1968) for a diversity of views concerning the state of the common law authorities with respect
to non-ancillary restraints of trade prior to the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890. Before the
North Carolina General Assembly adopted the substantive portions of § I of the Sherman Act as
part of the North Carolina antitrust law in 1913 (now N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1 (1965)), the United
States Supreme Court made it clear that the Sherman Act had a broader application than the
common law. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 297 (1908).
2
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-2 (1965).
3
rhe 1969 legislation which expanded chapter 75 changed the title from "Monopolies and
Trusts" to its present form. Ch. 833, § l(a), [19691 N.C. Sess. L. 930. Chapter 75 is reprinted in
its entirety in the Appendix, infra p. 256.
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tion" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices."' 4 Thus, it is also
essential to consider the common law of unfair competition in North
Carolina.
In addition to looking to the common law as applied by the North
Carolina Supreme Court, reference to the United States Supreme Court

decisions on federal antitrust laws should be helpful in interpreting some
of the provisions in chapter 75. This is particularly true of sections 7515 and 75-1.1,1 since these provisions were borrowed, respectively, from
section one of the Sherman Act 7 and section five of the Federal Trade

Commission Act.' Further, in predicting the legality of a particular
business practice that may be in interstate commerce or affect interstate
commerce, consideration should be given to federal laws as well as to

state laws. The doctrine of federal preemption, for the most part, does
not apply in the antitrust area; consequently, both state law and federal

law apply in many situations.9 Of necessity, comparisons of state and
federal law must be limited.
Neither state nor federal law dealing with the so-called regulated

industries-such as public utilities, banks, insurance, and water and air
resources-is included.
II.

A

BIT OF HISTORY

Prior to the enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890,1°
North Carolina had both constitutional and statutory provisions directed against monopolies, trusts, and similar devices to restrict compe4
Ch. 833, § l(b), [1969] 930. This provision, enacted on June 12, 1969, is presently codified
as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (Supp. 1971).
'N.C . GEN. STAT. § 75-1 (1965).
'Id. § 75-1.1 (Supp. 1971).
7
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209, presently codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
'"Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
commerce, are declared unlawful." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970).

'See J.

FLYNN, FEDERALISM AND STATE ANTITRUST REGULATION

(1964). But the national

policy as expressed in the federal patent laws will prevail over the state law of unfair competition.
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). Further, a state cannot give immunity to those who violate the federal
antitrust laws by authorizing them to violate it or by declaring that their action is lawful. Parker
v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, now 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
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tition. 1 The North Carolina Constitution of 1776 declared that "perpe-

tuities and Monopolies are contrary to the Genius of a free State and
ought not to be allowed."' 2 In 1970 "shall" was substituted for
"ought." Thus today, article 1, section thirty-four of the North Caroare contrary to
lina Constitution reads: "Perpetuities and monopolies
'3
the genius of a free state and shall not be allowed."'
On March 11, 1889 the North Carolina General Assembly enacted

an antitrust statute." This occurred only nine days after the passage of
a Kansas statute that is frequently cited as the first in the nation. 5
Justice Walter Clark (later Chief Justice) of the North Carolina Supreme Court described the situation that gave impetus to the enactment
of both state and federal antitrust legislation:
First, consider the nature of the operation of these illegal combinations. They combine vast masses of capital; then whenever they find an
"Article 1, § 33 of the 1970 Constitution of North Carolina provides: "No hereditary emoluments, privileges, or honors shall be granted or conferred in this State." This provision was § 22
of the Declaration of Rights, Constitution of 1776 and was carried forward in article 1, § 30 of
the Constitution of 1868. Article II, § 24 of the 1970 Constitution provides: "The General Assembly shall not enact any local, private, or special act or resolution: . . . (j) Regulating labor, trade,
This provision was added to article 11, § 29 of the 1868 Constimining, or manufacturing .
tution in 1916.
"N.C. CONST. Declaration of Rights, § 23 (1776).
"Licensing statutes must pass muster under this constitutional provision. See Hanft &
Hamrick, HaphazardRegimentation Under Licensing Statutes, 17 N.C.L. REv. I (1938). In State
v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731 (1949), the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a
licensing statute for photographers was unconstitutional on several grounds including the provision
against monopolies. The court thus overruled its prior decision in State v. Lawrence, 213 N.C. 674,
197 S.E. 586 (1938). Justice S.J. Ervin, Jr., writing for the majority in Ballance, did not consider
the court's split decision in Lawrence as invoking the doctrine of stare decisis. "Besides, [he said,]
the doctrine of stare decisis will not be applied in any event to preserve and perpetuate error and
grievous wrong." 229 N.C. at 767, 51 S.E.2d at 733.
"Ch. 374, [1889] N.C. Sess. L. 372.
"During 1888 bills against Trusts were introduced both in Congress and in many
state legislatures. The state debates resulted earlier in laws, so that before the first Federal
anti-trust statute was passed, July 2, 1890, no less than eight of the states had written
anti-trust laws on their books. This began the first important wave of state anti-trust
legislation.
Kansas, which even in 1887 had passed a law against monopolies in grain, led the
procession, passing its general anti-trust act March 2, 1889. In order followed Maine,
North Carolina, Tennessee, and Michigan, all in 1889, and South Dakota, Kentucky,
and Mississippi in 1890, before the passage of the Federal Act.
J. JENKS & W. CLARK, THE TRUST PROBLEM 213 (5th ed. rev. 1929). See also MARKETING LAWS
SURVEY, STATE ANTITRUST LAWS

(1955).

(1940); H.

THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY

155
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honest dealer or a competing manufacturer making a reasonable profit

on goods similar to theirs, they put an agent, or open a store nominally
in the name of another, alongside of him and undersell him till they

have broken him up or -forced him to sell out to the Trust; whereupon
immediately the price of the manufactured article is put up to the

consumer, and the price paid to the producer for raw material is reduced. The monopoly having no longer any competition. the producer

is forced to take an unjustly low price and the consumer is compelled
to pay an unjustly high one, and the opportunity of countless thousands
of men, who would have been dealers and manufacturers, to support

their families is destroyed. Those dealers and manufacturers would by
their competition have guaranteed just prices to the creator of the raw

material and reasonable prices to the consumer; but the Trusts destroy
both classes alike, and put the profits into their own coffers."

The statute enacted in North Carolina in 1889 was aimed at combinations that fixed priceg or curtailed production and at individual businessmen who sold below cost for the purpose of "breaking down" competitors. The penalties for attempting to form or for forming a "trust" were
fines up to ten thousand dollars or imprisonment for not more than ten
years.'7
From 1889 to 1913 the General Assembly in five different sessions
"Clark, How Trusts Can Be Crushed, 25 THE ARENA 264,266 (1901).
17Ch. 374, [1889] N.C. Sess. L. 372. The full text of this historic statute follows:
An act to prohibit trusts in the State of North Carolina, and to provide for the punishment
of persons connected with them.
The General Assembly of North Carolina do enact:

SECTION 1. That all combinations and trusts as defined by this act are unlawful,
dangerous to the liberty of the people, and are hereby forbidden to be formed or carried
on in this State.
SEC. 2. That a trust is an arrangement, understanding or agreement, either private
or public, entered into by two or more persons or corporations for the purpose of
increasing or reducing the price of the shares of stock of any company or corporation,
or of any class of products, materials or manufactured articles, beyond the price that
would be fixed by the natural demand for or the supply of such shares, products, materials or manufactured articles; and any attempt to carry out such purpose shall be evidence
that such arangement (sic), understanding or agreement exists.
SEC. 3. That any persons, company or corporation who shall form, or attempt
to form, a trust in this State, or the agent or representative of any trust in any State or
county, who shall attempt to carry on operations in this State, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and upon conviction may be fined not more than ten thousand dollars or
may be imprisoned not more than ten years for each offence.
SEC. 4. That any person, company or corporation who enter into an arrangement,
understanding or agreement not to mine, manufacture, buy, sell, or transport more than
a certain specified amount of any goods, products or commodities within a specified
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either amended or rewrote the antitrust statute.' 8 But it was not until
1912 that the first case involving the antitrust statute reached the North
Carolina Supreme Court. In Smith v. Morganton Ice Co.1" the court
upheld an award for damages to an ice dealer who claimed that his
business was destroyed by the unlawful practices of a competitor. Chief
Justice Clark, writing for the court, had the following to say about
enforcement of the antitrust statute:
It is, however, singular, that with numerous and glaring instances
of the violation of law and right, in the manner herein shown by other
parties and to a far vaster extent in the twenty-one years since this
statute was passed [reference must have been to the 1889 statute], and
time, will have violated section three of this act and will be liable to indictment therefor;
and any person, company or corporation who give bond or make a forfeit of any kind
not to break such arrangement, understanding or agreement shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction thereof shall be fined or imprisoned, or both, in the discretion
of the court.
SEC. 5. That any merchant, broker, manufacturer or dealers in raw materials of
any kind, or the agent of such persons, who shall sell any particular class of goods, raw
materials or manufactured articles for less than actual cost for the purpose of breaking
down competitors, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction may be fined
or imprisoned, or both, in the discretion of the court: Provided, that nothing contained
in this act shall operate or be construed so as to forbid or prevent any person or persons
who desire and intend to purchase any article or commodity for his or their own use or
consumption, from combining or otherwise lawfully acting so as to protect or help
themselves from imposition in the cost or purchase price of such articles or commodities
as they or either of them may design and intend to use or consume.
SEC. 6. That this act shall be in full force and effect from and after the first day
of May of the year one thousand eight hundred and eighty-nine.
Ratified the 11th day of March, A.D. 1889.
"sThe antitrust statute was rewritten in 1899, ch. 666, [1899] N.C. Sess. L. 852, and in 1901,
ch. 586, [1901] N.C. Sess. L. 820. In 1907 a new statute was passed, ch. 218, [1907] N.C. Sess. L.
254. This statute was amended in 1909. ch. 448, [1909] N.C. Sess. L. 772. The 1907 Act, as
amended in 1909, was rewritten in 1911. ch. 167, [1911] N.C. Sess. L. 321. North Carolina was
without an antitrust statute during the years 1905-1907 because the 1901 statute was not carried
forward by the Code Commission in the North Carolina Revisal of 1905. In 1907 the chairman of
the Code Commission gave the following explanation for the deletion:
My recollection is that we did not bring forward the antitrust law because we were
advised that the North Carolina statute was a copy of the Texas statute and as the
Supreme Court of the United States had declared the Texas statute unconstitutional, we
thought it not wise to bring it forward, but to leave it to the General Assembly to enact
an act that would meet the objections of the Supreme Court if that body deemed it
advisable to do so. . ..
Raleigh News and Observer, Jan. 10, 1907, at 4, col. 2. The case referred to is Connolly v. Union
Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902), which was overruled in Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940).
19159 N.C. 151, 74 S.E. 961 (1912).
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indeed in violation of the common law, which punishes such offenses,
that this case, in which a small infraction of the law is involved, is the
only one that has come to this Court. The enforcement of the law and
the protection of the plaintiff and the public in this instance is noteworthy when with a statute so widely known and discussed and when the
evil has been so great and manifest there has been no attempt to enforce
the law in other cases.2
In 1913 Governor Locke Craig, in his inaugural address to the
General Assembly, said the following about the trust problem and the
need for stronger legislation:
NORTH CAROLINA'S TRIBUTE TO MONOPOLY
North Carolina has paid, too, her quota of tribute to the rapacity
of unlawful monopoly. We have been preyed upon by trusts abroad and
by trusts at home. They take from the earnings of all. The poor must
suffer most. The farmers especially have been plundered and oppressed
in the open day, without hindrance, by a great concern adjudged now
to be in violation of law. We have been a patient, long-suffering people.
In our platform there is promised legislation that "will make the existence of these concerns impossible." There is promised the enforcement
of the civil and criminal law against the trust and against the man
behind the trust.
TRUST LAWS WITH HANDCUFFS
In the fulfillment of this promise we need a trust law, clad in blue
uniform, that can raid a trust den with a warrant and handcuffs.in its
hand. The guilty should be made to tremble, the innocent may fear not.
While I am Governor no innocent man shall suffer by the criminal law.
The cry will be raised that such legislation will injure business.
The trust will shield itself, if possible, behind legitimate industry. It will
paralyze, if it can, the hand of justice by warnings of disaster from the
interference with business.
DESTRUCTION OF PIRACY PROTECTION OF BUSINESS
The destruction of piracy is the protection of industry. It is the
duty of the State to protect and to encourage every enterprise, small
and great. And this is the age of large enterprises. They are essential
in the economy of our civilization and are the agencies of its tremendous power and accomplishment. "All the currents of the time run to
"Id. at 156-57, 74 S.E. at 964.

206

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

centralization. To successfully resist it we must throttle steam and
discharge electricity from human service." But these forces should be
for the service and not for the oppression of mankind. 2
Under the leadership of Representative Edward J. Justice of Guilford
County, a new antitrust statute was enacted in 1913 without discussion
in the House of Representatives and, after minor amendments, without
a dissenting vote in the senate. 2 Although Governor Craig gave impetus
to this legislation, credit for its provisions should go to three persons-namely, former Governor William W. Kitchen, Representative
Justice, and former Senator Reuben D. Reid. On two occasions Kitchen,
while Governor, suggested adoption of sections one and two of the Sherman Act as part of the state antitrust law.2 3The 1913 General Assembly
adopted- a counterpart of section one of the Sherman Act?' but did not
adopt section two. However, prohibitions against six specific types of
business practices were reenacted. These provisions closely resembled
those originally advocated by Senator Reid in 1907. They were directed,
for the most part, at the exercise of monopoly power. Hence, it may have
been deemed unnecessary to adopt section two of the Sherman Act. For
the first time the General Assembly, in 1913, provided for effective
enforcement procedures in the antitrust law. Representative Justice deserves credit for this achievement. These procedures were similar to those
that had been advocated unsuccessfully by him in the 1907 session of
the General Assembly.2 All of the substantive provisions of the 1913
legislation currently appear in chapter 75 of the General Statutes in
sections.75-1 and 75-5(b) subsections (1) through (6).26 Except for minor
editorial revisions, these six subsections remain intact. In 1961 subsection (7) was added by the General Assembly at the suggestion of Gover1

PuBLic LETTERS AND PAPERS OF LOCKE CRAIG 11 (M. Jones ed. 1916).

-Ch. 41, [1913] N.C. Sess. L. 66. "The House passed the Justice antitrust bill, which applies
the Federal anti-trust law to the State, enacts the provisions of the old Reid anti-trust bill of the

1907 session and provides machinery for the Attorney General to enforce the law. The bill passed
without discussion." Charlotte Daily Observer, Jan. 29, 1913, at 1, col. 7. See Steelman, Edward
J. Justice: Profile of a ProgressiveLegislator,1899-1913,48 N.C. HIST. REV. 147 (1971).
2PUBLIc DOCUMENTS OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA no. 1, at 14 (1911) (Governor's
Biennial Message to the General Assembly); PUBLIC DocurIENTs OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA no. 1, at 10-11 (1913) (same).
24
Ch. 41, § 1, [1913] N.C. Sess. L. 66.
2'These enforcement procedures are discussed at page infra.
21N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-1, 75-5(b)(1) to (6) (1965).
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nor Terry Sanford.7 Although this subsection was deemed essential to
stop the practice by suppliers of making identical bids for state contracts, it is a broadly worded price-fixing statute. In 1969 section 75-17
was added to prohibit a lender from requiring a borrower to deal with a
particular insurer.2s In the same year, largely due to the initiative of
Attorney General Robert Morgan and Deputy Attorney General Jean
A. Benoy, the General Assembly adopted, in substance, section five of
the Federal Trade Commission Act as section 75-1.1 of the antitrust
law. 2 9 Thus, as previously indicated, section 75-1 is borrowed from the
Sherman Act, and section 75- 1.1 is copied from the Federal Trade Commission Act. Although section 75-5 resembles the Clayton Act"° in that
both are aimed at specific practices, the North Carolina provisions are
not taken from the federal act. All but subsection (7) of section 75-5
antedated the passage of the Clayton Act, and subsection (7) did not
come from federal law.
Chapter 75 is primarily directed at non-ancillary restraints of trade,
such as price fixing, exclusive territorial arrangements, exclusive dealing,
refusals to deal, monopolization, attempts to monopolize, combinations
and conspiracies to monopolize, unfair methods of competition, and
unfair trade practices. The substantive law of ancillary restraints of
trade is a product of the judiciary and not of the legislature. However,
chapter 75 has two provisions concerning ancillary restraints. Section
75-4 specifies that agreements limiting the rights of any person to do
business in the state must be in writing and signed by the party sought
to be bound.3 1 Section 75-5(d) declares:
-Ch. 407, § 1, [1961] N.C. Sess. L. 563, now N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-5(b)(7) (1965). According
to Representative I.C. Crawford the "bill" was designed to stop identical bidding on state contracts. Raleigh News and Observer, May 6, 1961, at 7, col. 6.
-Ch. 1032, § 1, [1969] N.C. Sess. L. 1185, now N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-17 (Supp. 1971). Also
§ 75-27 of the General Statutes was added in 1969 to deal with the problem of unsolicited merchandise through the mail. Ch. 70, § 1, [1969] N.C. Sess. L. 52, now N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-27 (Supp.

1971).
-Ch. 833, § l(b), [1969] N.C. Sess. L. 930, now N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (Supp. 1971),
adopted from Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970). See Morgan, The
People's Advocate in the Marketplace-The Role of the North CarolinaAttorney General in the
Field of Consumer Protection,6 VAcE FoREST INTRA. L. REv. 1 (1969).
-15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970).
3"Prior to the enactment of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-4 (1965) in 1913, no writing was required.
Wooten v. Harris, 153 N.C. 43, 68 S.E. 898 (1910). Restrictions in employment contracts as well
as vendor-vendee contracts are required to be in writing. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Griffin, 258
N.C. 179, 128 S.E.2d 139 (1962).
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This section does not make it illegal for a person to sell his business and good will to a competitor, and agree in writing not to enter
business in competition with the purchaser in a limited territory if such
agreement does not violate the principles of the common law against
trusts and does not otherwise violate the provisions of this chapter."
In North Carolina the cases involving ancillary restraints far outnumber
those dealing with non-ancillary restraints. Although the focus of this
article is on non-ancillary restraints, a brief summary of the law of
ancillary restraints is given in order to provide a context for the discussion of non-ancillary restraints in the larger body of law known as trade
regulation.
III.

ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS OF TRADE

An ancillary restraint is an agreement that is subordinate to the
main lawful purpose of a larger transaction that it is designed to effectuate.3 3 Typical examples are covenants not to compete in connection
with the sale of a business or professional practice and in partnership
agreements and employment contracts. Mutual promises provide the
consideration for a covenant not to compete.3 4 Covenants extracted from
an employee subsequent to employment must be supported by additional
consideration, such as a promotion or a raise in salary. 5 In North
Carolina a promise of continued employment is not sufficient consideration.3 6 In several cases the covenants of employees not to compete were
3
unenforceable because the court found a lack of consideration. 1
3N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§ 75-5(d) (1965).

3See generally Breckenridge, Restraint of Trade in North Carolina,7 N.C.L. REV. 249 (1929);
Note, Injunction-Employee's Agreement Not to Compete, 26 N.C.L. REv. 402 (1948); Note,
Covenants Not To Compete, 38 N.C.L. REV. 395 (1960); Note, Restraints on Trade-Covenants
in Employment Contracts not to Compete within the Entire United States, 49 N.C.L. REV. 393
(1971). Land use restrictions imposed in connection with the conveyance.of land reflect a type of
ancillary restraint. For example, in Quadro Stations, Inc. v. Gilley, 7 N.C. App. 227, 172 S.E.2d
237 (1970), the court of appeals upheld a promise of a grantor made at the time of sale that he
would not permit the sale or advertising of petroleum products on a four-acre tract of retained land
for a period of twenty-five years.
"Scott v. Gillis, 197 N.C. 223, 148 S.E. 315 (1929); Welcome Wagon Int'l, Inc. v. Pender,
255 N.C. 244, 120 S.E.2d 739 (1961).
"James C. Greene Co. v. Arnold, 266 N.C. 85, 145 S.E.2d 304 (1965) (employee became a
manager, which jury found to be sufficient consideration).
6Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543 (1944).
3'James C. Greene Co. v. Kelley, 261 N.C. 166, 134 S.E.2d 166 (1964); Worth Chemical Corp.
v. Freeman, 261 N.C. 780, 136 S.E.2d 118 (1964); Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543
(1944).
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In determining the validity of a covenant not to compete, the North
Carolina courts apply the rule of reason. An agreement found to be
unreasonable is void.3 8 In Beam v. Rutledge31 Chief Justice Stacy, writing for the court, stated:
The test to be applied in determining the reasonableness of a restrictive covenant is to consider whether the restraint affords only a fair
protection to the interest of the party in whose favor it is given, and is
not so broad as to interfere with the rights of the public.40
Whether or not an ancillary restraint is reasonable is a question of law.41
The court will examine the circumstances of each case. Thus, the decided
cases at most provide guidelines and should not be relied upon as precedents. In each case the court will examine the reasonableness of the time
and the territorial aspects of the restraint.
A.

Time

In earlier cases involving sales of a medical practice 42 and a milling
business, 43 the court upheld a promise not to compete for the lifetime of
the covenantor. However, recently in Jewel Box Stores Corp. v.
Morrow4 4 Justice Sharp, writing for the court, carefully analyzed the
facts of that case, which involved the sale of a jewelry business, before
deciding that a promise not to engage in a competing business for ten
years in the City of Morganton or within ten miles thereof was reasonable. Today, it is probable that a ten-year restriction on the practice of
medicine in a specified locality would be found to be against the public
interest and thus unreasonable.
The time element is scrutinized more carefully in employment contracts than in contracts involving the sale of a business or a professional
3SKadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543 (1944).
39217 N.C. 670,9 S.E.2d 476 (1940) (partnership agreement of doctors).
lId. at 673, 9 S.E.2d at 478. The court in considering the validity of a covenant not to compete
in an employment contract stated that it would enforce such a covenant if it is "'(1) in writing,
(2) entered into at the time and as a part of the contract of employment, (3) based on valuable
considerations, (4) reasonable both as to time and territory embraced in the restrictions [] (5) fair
to the parties, and (6) not against public policy.'" Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Griffin, 258 N.C.
179, 181, 128 S.E.2d 139, 140-41 (1962), quoting Asheville Associates, Inc. v. Miller, 255 N.C.
400, 121 S.E.2d 593 (1961).
"Jewel Box Stores Corp. v. Morrow, 272 N.C. 659, 158 S.E.2d 840 (1968).
"Hauser v. Harding, 126 N.C. 295, 35 S.E. 586 (1900).
4'Kramer v. Old, 119 N.C. 1,25 S.E. 813 (1896).
4"272 N.C. 659, 158 S.E.2d 840 (1968).
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practice or in partnership agreements. In Welcome Wagon International, Inc. v. Pender4 5 the court in a four-to-three decision upheld a
five-year restriction. The dissent considered three years or less to be
ample time to protect the interest of the employer in that case. Subsequently, in upholding a four-year restriction, the court commented that
four years approached the maximum that it was inclined to approve in
46
employment contracts.
B.

Territory

A covenant may be invalidated either because the territory is not
accurately defined4 7 or because it is too broad in scope. 8 In an early case
the court permitted to pass unnoticed a covenant that the vendors "'will
not continue [the] business of milling in the vicinity of Elizabeth
City.' "41 Later, the court held that the "territory surrounding Yadkinville" was too indefinite; nevertheless, the restraint was enforced within
the corporate limits. 0 More recently, the court stated that it "cannot by
splitting up the territory make a new contract for the parties-it must
stand or fall integrally."'"
Suppose, however, that the territorial restriction is expressed in
divisible terms. Will the court enforce as many units as are reasonable
and "blue pencil" the remainder? In Welcome Wagon International,
Inc. v. Pender,5 2 the defendant had been employed as a "hostess" in
"Fayetteville and the surrounding trade territory." She resigned and
began to compete with her former employer in Fayetteville. Suit was
instituted by her former employer to enjoin the violation of the following
provision in the employment contract:
-255 N.C. 244, 120 S.E.2d 739 (1961).
"James C. Greene Co. v. Arnold, 266 N.C. 85, 145 S.E.2d 304 (1965).
47Shute v. Heath, 131 N.C. 281, 42 S.E. 704 (1902) (sale of lumber and cotton ginning
business).
ISMaola Ice Cream Co. v. Maola Milk & Ice Cream Co., 238 N.C. 317, 77 S.E.2d 910 (1953)
(division of territory in connection with partial assignment of a trade mark); Comfort Springs
Corp. v. Burroughs, 217 N.C. 658, 9 S.E. 2d 473 (1940) (employment contract).
'1Kramer v. Old, 119 N.C. 1, 9, 25 S.E. 813, 814 (1896). Later the court cast some doubt on
the validity of such a provision. Shute v. Heath, 131 N.C. 281, 42 S.E. 704 (1902).
OHauser v. Harding, 126 N.C. 295, 35 S.E. 586 (1900) (sale of medical practice).
51
Noe v. McDevitt, 228 N.C. 242, 245, 45 S.E.2d 121, 123 (1947), noted in 26 N.C.L. REv.
402 (1948) (employment contract).
5'255 N.C. 244, 120 S.E. 2d 739 (1961). The court, in effect, applied the "blue pencil" rule in
Sonotone Corp. v. Baldwin, 227 N.C. 387,42 S.E. 2d 352 (1947).
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Now, therefore, for and in consideration of this employment and
the compensation to be earned and paid to the Hostess hereunder, said
Hostess covenants and agrees that she will not during the term of this
employment, and for a period of five whole years thereafter, engage
directly or indirectly for herself or as agent, representative or employee
of others, in the same kind or similar business as that engaged in by
the Company (1) in Fayetteville, North Carolina, or (2) in any other
city, town, borough, township, village or other place in the State of
North Carolina, in which the Company is then engaged in rendering
its said service, (3) in any city, town, borough, township, village or
other place in the United States in which the Company is then engaged
in rendering its said service, or (4) in any city, town, borough, township
or village in the United States in which the Company has been or has
signified its intentions to be, engaged in rendering its said service.In a four-to-three decision the court applied the "blue pencil" rule and
held that it was patent- that (1) was not unreasonable; (2) was for the
chancellor to decide; and (3) and (4) were unreasonable. Justice Bobbitt
(now Chief Justice), writing for the dissent, considered the "blue pencil"
rule unsound and argued that the agreement's legality depended on form
rather than substance. He stated further:
In testing the reasonableness of a covenant restricting competition
after termination of employment, the impact upon the employee so
restricted should receive due consideration. The covenant, in its entirety, hangs over him. He cannot foresee whether a court, at the end
of protracted litigation, will enforce the covenant as written or only
within a segment of the territory therein explicitly described."
The "blue pencil" rule in territorial limitations is far from being firmly
established in North Carolina. Moreover, the court has refused to apply
it when the prohibited "activities" (not territory) were expressed in the
alternative; instead, the entire covenant was struck down because it was
5
too broad.
In applying the rule of reason, the court does not adhere to the old
notion that a restraint throughout the "Kingdom" is a general restraint
and therefore void. In an early case the court upheld a state-wide re53255 N.C. at 246, 120 S.E.2d at 740.
51Id. at 256-57, 120 S.E.2d at 748.
OHenley Paper Co. v. McAllister, 253 N.C. 529, 117 S.E.2d 431 (1960) ("manufacture, sale

or distribution").
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straint in connection with the sale of a newspaper. 56 Recently, in Harivell
Enterprisesv. Heim,57 a nation-wide restraint was upheld in an employment contract. Justice Moore, writing for the court, said:
Because of the increased technical and scientific knowledge used
in business today, the emphasis placed upon research and development,
the new products and techniques constantly being developed, the
nation-wide activities (even world-wide in some instances) of many
business enterprises, and the resulting competition on a very broad
front, the need for such restrictive covenants to protect the interests of
the employer becomes increasingly important. If during the time of
employment new products are developed and new activities are undertaken, reason would require their protection as well as those in existence at the date of the contract, and to a company actually engaged in
nation-wide activities, nation-wide protection would appear to be reasonable and proper.5 8
C.

Conclusion

The reasonableness of time and territory restrictions will be considered in relation to each other.5 9 But a finding that they are reasonable is
not conclusive of the validity of the covenant. Public policy also must
be considered, and, as Chief Justice Clark pointed out, the statute does
not authorize ancillary restraints of trade to be used as a device to
establish a trust or otherwise to violate the antitrust laws.60
IV.

NON-ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS OF TRADE

Direct or non-ancillary restraints of trade fall into many categories.
Some of the important ones are price-fixing, exclusive territorial arrangements, exclusive dealing, refusals to deal, monopolization, attempts to monopolize, combinations and conspiracies to monopolize,
and pricing policies designed to injure or destroy competition.', Each of
"'Cowan v. Fairbrother, 118 N.C. 406,24 S.E. 212 (1896).
-276 N.C. 475, 173 S.E.2d 316 (1970), notedin49 N.C.L. REV. 393 (1971).
"Id. at 480-81, 173 S.E.2d at 320.
"Jewel Box Stores Corp. v. Morrow, 272 N.C. 659, 665, 158 S.E.2d 840,844 (1968).
OMoorehead Sea Food Co. v. Way, 169 N.C. 679, 688-89, 86 S.E. 603, 607-08 (1915) (dissenting opinion). See Note, Antitrust Significance of Covenants Not to Compete, 64 Mimci. L. REv.
503, 505 n.14 (1965).
"For an excellent bibliography on each of these topics, see S. OPPENHEI&I & G. NVESTON,
FEDERAL ANTITRUsT LAWS (3d ed. 1968, Supp. 1970). S. OPPENHEIM, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES
(2d ed. 1965). A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1970); REPORT OF
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these selected types of non-ancillary restraints is discussed in order.
A.

Price-Fixing

Price-fixing arrangements appear in a variety of settings. Sellers or
buyers may band together and exert joint power (a horizontal arrangement) over prices rather than competing with each other. A producer or
distributor may enter into vertical agreements or pursue some other
course to control resale prices. An individual or firm may adopt pricing
policies that involve price discriminations among customers, or prices
may be unreasonably lowered for the purpose of injuring a competitor.
(1) HorizontalPrice-Fixing
In State v. Craft12 milk dealers who controlled sixty percent of the
milk supply in Wilmington combined to raise the price of milk and
published their agreement in a newspaper. They were convicted of the
common law offense of price-fixing and fined. Chief Justice Clark, in
commenting on the nature of the offense, said:
A conspiracy to raise the prices of the necessaries of life being a
crime at common law, it could be no defense to show that another
person than one of the conspirators sold the same commodity at as
high a price as these defendants had agreed upon, or that the witness
might think the price agreed on a reasonable one, or that the article
could not be produced profitably at less than the price agreed on, in
view of the conditions under which the defendants were carrying on the
business. The indictment is not for raising the price, but for the combination and agreement to do so.6 3
This case could have been prosecuted under section 75-1, which makes
illegal "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce in the State of North
Carolina."'" However, neither the solicitor nor the trial judge was aware
that the General Assembly had borrowed this section from the Sherman
(1955);
AMERICAN BAR ASs'N, ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS 1955-1968 (1968) (Supplement to Report of the
Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, 1955). For a discussion of
exemptions under the federal antitrust laws see Committee on Antitrust Exemptions, ABA Section
of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Exemptions, 33 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (1967).
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS

N.C. 208, 83 S.E. 772 (1914).
uld.at 211, 83 S.E. at 773.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1 (1965).
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Act in 1913.65 Section 75-1 has remained virtually unnoticed by the state
and by private litigants in challenging price fixing arrangements. On the
other hand, section one of the Sherman Act,6" its parent statute, has
proved highly effective. In United States v. Trenton Potteries,67 the
United States Supreme Court made it clear that the reasonableness of
the price fixed had no bearing on the illegality of the agreement. Later,
in United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil Co.,6s the Court went further
and concluded that any "combination" that tampers with price structures is engaged in an unlawful activity. In this case the following rule
was enunciated: "Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the
purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or
stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce
is illegal per se."69 Subsequently, agreements to fix maximum prices
have been held to be within the ban of the per se rule set forth in
Socony. 70 Further, the rule itself has been modified to the extent that it
is not necessary to prove purpose and effect. Proof of either purpose or
effect is sufficient to invoke the rule. 71 In United States v. Container
Corp. of America,72 the Court held that exchanges of information about
the most recent price charged or quoted among sellers, albeit on an
irregular basis, constituted concerted action which had the effect of
stabilizing prices even though at a downward level. Thus, there was an
unlawful chilling of the vigor of price competition. This decision does
not hold all exchanges of price information unlawful per se, but it drastically limits the circumstances under which price data can be shared by
competitors. The Court summarized the federal law on horizontal price
fixing as follows:
"Id. at 214, 83 S.E. at 775.
"15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
-273 U.S. 392 (1927).
-310 U.S. 150 (1940).

'Id.at 223.
'Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Albrecht v.
Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (maximum resale price fixing).
7
n Socony the Court stated in footnote 59 that it did not mean that both purpose and power
to fix prices are necessary for the establishment of a conspiracy under section one of the Sherman

Act. 310 U.S. at 225 n.59. One may be guilty of conspiring although incapable of committing the
objective offense. 310 U.S. at 224-25; United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 222
(1969) (effect); Sun Oil Co. v. Vickers Ref. Co., 414 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1969) (neither purpose nor
effect; hence, no violation).
72393 U.S. 333 (1969). Several trade association cases involving exchange of price information
are reviewed by the Court.

A NTITR UST

1972]

[P]rice fixing is contrary to the policy of competition underlying the
Sherman Act

. .

. [I]ts illegality does not depend on a showing of its

unreasonableness, since it is conclusively presumed to be unreasonable.
It makes no difference whether the motives of the participants are good
or evil; whether the price fixing is accomplished by express contract or
by some more subtle means; whether the participants possess market
control; whether the amount of interstate commerce affected is large
or small; or whether the effect of the agreement is to raise or to decrease
prices. 73
Although the North Carolina Supreme Court has occasionally
looked to federal interpretation of the Sherman Act for guidance in
deciding cases under the North Carolina antitrust laws, 74 litigants, including the state, as previously indicated, have not utilized section 75-1
in price-fixing cases. In 1960 the State Division of Purchase and Contract began receiving identical bids for bread. 75 Instead of attacking this
practice under section 75-1, new legislation was sought by state officials. 76 In 1961 the General Assembly responded by enacting section 755(b)(7), which makes the following conduct unlawful:
Except as may be otherwise provided by article 10 of chapter 66,
entitled "Fair Trade", while engaged in buying or selling any goods
in this State to make, enter into, execute or carry out any contract,
obligation or agreement of any kind by which the parties thereto or any
two or more of them bind themselves not to sell or dispose of any goods
or any article of trade, use or consumpion, below a common sandard
figure, or fixed value, or establish or settle the price of such goods
between them, or between themselves and others, at a fixed or graduated figure, so as directly or indirectly to preclude a free and unrestricted competition among themselves, or any purchase or consumers
in the sale of such goods.7
Although triggered by the practice of sellers making identical bids for
state contracts, this is a very comprehensive statute inasmuch as it applies to buyers and to sellers and prohibits horizontal and vertical (except
"United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 309-10 (1956) (footnotes omitted).
"E.g.. State v. Craft, 168 N.C. 208, 83 S.E. 772 (1914); Bennett v. Southern Ry., 211 N.C.
474, 191 S.E. 240 (1937); Waldron Buick Co. v. General Motors Corp., 254 N.C. 117, 118 S.E.2d
559 (1961).
75Raleigh News and Observer, Mar. 24, 1961, at 1,col. 3.
"Raleigh News and Observer, Apr. 22, 1961, at 5, col. 4.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-5(b)(7) (1965).
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fair trade)7" price-fixing agreements. Moreover, it is not confined to
situations in which the state is a buyer or seller. This statute refers to
"any goods or any article of trade." Section 75-5(a)(2) defines "goods"
to include "goods, wares, merchandise, articles or other things of
value. ' 79 The court has held that the "service" of transporting gasoline
is a thing of value,"0 thus indicating that price fixing in the service
industries would be covered by section 75-5 (b)(7).
The inclusion of "buyers" in the 1961 statute renders unnecessary
section 75-5(b)(1), which makes it unlawful "[t]o agree or conspire with
any other person to put down or keep down the price of any goods
produced in this State by the labor of others which goods the person
intends, plans or desires to buy. 18' This provision was designed to outlaw a practice of the tobacco trust whereby instructions were given by
the members of the trust to their buyers not to bid beyond a previously
agreed upon price for leaf tobacco. First introduced in 1907, it was
deleted by committee amendment. Several senators complained that
"[b]y the amendment . . .the chief trust doing [the] most harm in

North Carolina is virtually exempted.1 82 In 1909 section 75-5(b)(1) was
enacted.83 Apparently, no effort has been made to use it. A possible
explanation is that in 1911 the United States successfully prosecuted the
tobacco trust under the Sherman Act.84
Section 75-5(b)(7) is a statutory deterrent to horizontal price fixing
by buyers and sellers that is as broad as the standard that the United
States Supreme Court established for price fixing agreements under
section one of the Sherman Act in United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil

Co. 5 Proof of a "contract, obligation or agreement" to fix prices is all
"Discussed under "vertical" price-fixing.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-5(b)(7) (1965).

"Bennett v. Southern Ry., 211 N.C. 474, 191 S.E. 240 (1937). But see Knutton v. Cofield,
273 N.C. 355, 160 S.E.2d 29 (1968) (exclusive-dealing aspect of a joint undertaking).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-5(b)(1) (1965).
'2JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 1004 (1907).
-Ch. 448, § 1, [1909] N.C. Sess. L. 772.
"In 1907 suit was brought by the United States under the Sherman Act which culminated in
a dissolution of the tobacco trust in 1911. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106
(1911). In 1944 three major tobacco companies were convicted of violations of the Sherman Act
including agreements fixing price ceilings for leaf tobacco. American Tobacco Co. v. United States,
147 F.2d 93 (1944). The United States Supreme Court reviewed and affirmed one aspect of this
case. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
-310 U.S. 150 (1940). See p. 214 supra.
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that is required to show a violation." There is no basis in this statute
for applying the rule of reason. In Patterson v. Southern Railway,8 7 the
court, in construing section 75-5(b)(3),1 s rejected a defense that the effect
of the rate agreement had been to lower the price of gasoline to the
consumer. Justice Seawell, writing for the court, eliminated the rule of
reason approach in the following language:
Generalizations respecting monopoly statutes, their purpose and
effect, cannot be expected equally to fit them all, but it may be laid
down as a principle common to our own laws that where an act has
been directly condemned by the statute, no power resides in the court
to balance the advantages of continuing the situation produced by
defendants' violation of law against the advantages of granting the
relief sought in the action, thereby making such a violator of the law a
sort of economic Robin Hood who may, with judicial approval, plunder the individual in the interest of the needy public.
. . .The law looks at the transaction "in the long run," adopting
the philosophy that the public is more interested in continuing competition than in reaping the temporary rewards of a fight in which it is
extinguished. 9
Former section 75-3,9o enacted in 1913, was intended to make it
BsN.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-5(c) (1965) provides:
Nothing herein shall be construed to make it illegal for an agent to represent more
than one principal, but this provision shall not be deemed to authorize two or more
principals to employ a common agent for the purpose of suppressing competition or
preventing the lowering of prices.
n214 N.C. 38, 198 S.E. 364 (1938).
8sN.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-5(b)(3) (1965).
s"214 N.C. at44, 198 S.E. at 367-68.
IO[A]II contracts, combinations in the form of trust, and conspiracies in restraint of
trade or commerce prohibited in [§§ 75-1 and 75-2] are hereby declared to be unreasonable and illegal, unless the persons entering into such contract, combination in the form
of trust, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce can show affirmatively upon
an indictment or civil action for violation of [§§ 75-1 and 75-2] that such contract,
combination in the form of trust, [or] conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce does
not injure the business of any competitor, or prevent anyone from becoming a competitor
because his or its business will be unfairly injured by reason of such contract, combination in the form of trust, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce.
Ch. 41, § 3, [1913] N.C. Sess. L. 66. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-266.19 (Supp. 1971) prohibits the
sale of milk below cost. Evidence of a sale below cost shall constitute prima facie evidence of a
violation of the statute, and the burden of rebutting the prima facie case is placed on the defendant.
For example, the defendant must show that milk was not used as a "loss leader" or to induce the
public to patronize his store.
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easier to prove a violation of the antitrust laws by establishing a prima
facie case. A defense was provided in this section when an accused was
able to show that no competitor was injured. Obviously, all competitors
could agree among themselves to submit identical bids for state contracts. This statutory "loophole" was closed by.the repeal of section 753 in 1961.11
(2)

Vertical Price-Fixing

Vertical agreements in the chain of distribution imposed by manufacturers or distributors for the ptirpose of controlling minimum or
specified resale prices violated the common law.12 Prior to 1937 it became well established that such agreements were per se unreasonable and
thus illegal under section one of the Sherman Act.9 3 Further, practices
of manufacturers that were designed to achieve resale price maintenance
and weit beyond a simple refusal to deal were condemned as an unfair
method of competition in violation of section five of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. 4 In 1937 Congress passed the Miller-Tydings Amendment 95 to section one of the Sherman Act, and in 1952 the Federal Trade
Commission Act was amended by the McGuire Act. 6 Each of these acts,
in effect, amends both the Sherman Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act. These two enabling statutes exempt from the Sherman Act and
the Federal Trade Commission Act certain resale price maintenance
agreements when resales are made of products subject to fair trade
agreements in states having operative Fair Trade Acts.
In 1937 the North Carolina General Assembly adopted a Fair
Trade Act.9 7 In Ely Lilly & Co. v. Saunders," the North Carolina Su9"Ch. 1153, § 1, [1961] N.C. Sess. L. 1582.
nDr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373,409 (1911).
1United States v. A. Sehrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920); Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy
Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208 (1921); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373

(1911).
"FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922), noted in I N.C.L. REV. 36 (1922).

For a case on refusal to deal with price cutters see United States v. Colgate &Co., 250 U.S. 300
(1919).
"ZAct of Aug. 17, 1937, ch. 690, 50 Stat. 693, presently embodied in 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
"Act of July 14, 1952, ch. 745, 66 Stat. 631, presently embodied in 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).

-Ch. 350, §§ 1-7, t0, [1937] N.C. Sess. L. 683, codified at N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§§ 66-50 to -57

(1965), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
"216 N.C. 163, 4 S.E.2d 528 (1939). Justice Barnhill wrote a vigorous dissent. Subsequently,
a trial judge ruled that the Fair Trade Act was unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court of North
Carolina held that the issue was not properly before him in a hearing on whether or not to continue

a temporary restraining order. Union Carbide Corp. v. Davis, 253 N.C. 324, 116 S.E.2d 792 (1960).
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preme Court decided that this Act did not contravene the anti-monopoly
provisions of the state constiution. Thus, a manufacturer or distributor
of a commodity which bears the trademark, brand, or name of the
producer or distributor may stipulate in a contract the minimum resale
price. Further, a non-signer who has knowledge of such contract must
abide by the minimum stipulated price or be subject to suit for unfair
competition by any person damaged thereby. But exemption is made for
purchases made by the State of North Carolina or any of its agencies
or political subdivisions. 9
The policy behind fair trade acts is generally stated to be that of
permitting trademark owners to protect good will by preventing "lossleader" selling.' However, such acts go beyond combatting promotional price-cutting and strike at all price reductions that would pass to
the consumer the economies of competitive distribution.'
Insofar as
"fair traded" items are involved, price competition may be non-existent
at the retail level. The impact on competition is the same as if all retailers
in the state had entered into an horizontal price-fixing agreement not to
sell below a stipulated minimum.
Since the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the North Carolina Fair Trade Act, five state supreme courts have held their laws
unconstitutional in their entirety, and twenty others have held the nonsigner clause to be unconstitutional.1 2 Legislatures in four states have
repealed their fair trade laws. 10 3 On the other hand, the North Carolina
General Assembly, in enacting section 75-5(b)(7) in 1961, expressly provided that its adoption should not affect the Fair Trade Act.
In 1971 the General Assembly authorized the Milk Commission to
engage in vertical price fixing.'" 4 Henceforth the Commission has the
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-57 (Supp. 1971). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-55 (1965) for several
situations in which fair trade contracts are inapplicable including commodities sold to religious,
charitable, or educational organizations for use and not for resale.
'0 in 1971 the General Assembly enacted a provision designed to prohibit loss-leader selling of
milk. Ch. 779, § 1, [1971] N.C. Sess. L. _
codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-266.19 (Supp.
1971). Apparently the amendment was designed to overrule North Carolina Milk Comm'n v.
National Food Stores, Inc., 270 N.C. 323, 154 S.E.2d 548 (1967).
10'See generally REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITrEE TO STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAWS 149-55 (1955). Intrabrand competition in services and terms of sale and other
non-price competitive practices are not affected by fair trade laws.
102AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS 1955-1968, at 112 (1968).
'These were Hawaii, Kansas, Nebraska, and Nevada. Alaska, Texas, Missouri, Vermont, and
the District of Columbia have never had fair trade laws. Id.
codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-266.8(10)(b)
14Ch. 779, § 1, [1971] N.C. Sess. L. __
(Supp. 1971).
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power not only to fix the price paid to producers but also to establish

minimum wholesale and resale prices in any market area.
Vertical price-fixing agreements not exempt by legislation1 5 should

:be per se illegal under section 75-5(b)(7). Moreover, such agreements
also are a restraint of trade at common law and hence a violation of
section 75-1. 16
(3)

Conclusion on Price-Fixing

Section 75-5(b)(7) is sufficiently comprehensive to deal with both
horizontal and vertical price-fixing agreements that are not exempted
from the antitrust laws.107 Thus, it is not necessary to resort to the
common law or to section 75-1. On the other hand, some business
practices may fall short of being a price-fixing arrangement but, never-

theless, may affect prices in such a manner and to such a degree as to
constitute a restraint of trade. In such an even section 75-1 may be
invoked. An agreement not to bid was proscribed by the common law
and is subject to scrutiny under section 75-1.105 Further, exchanges of
price data among competitors should be examined under section 75-1 to

determine if a particular practice constitutes a restraint of trade.'

Sec-

tion 75-5(b)(7) and section 75-1 together provide adequate legislation to

cope with combinations, conspiracies, and contracts that fix or affect
prices in such a manner as to result in a restraint of trade.
5tRelief may be denied to one enforcing a fair trade agreement where it can be shown that
such agreements have not been enforced in a diligent and nondiscriminatory manner. See 2 CCH
6322 (1971).
TRADE REG. REP.
"'Such common law restraints are made a violation of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1 (1965) by id.
§ 75-2.
"'In construing a statute the North Carolina Supreme Court looks to the intent of the Legislature.
[I]ntent must be found from the language of the act, its legislative history and the
circumstances surrounding its adoption which throw light upon the evil sought to be
remedied. Testimony, even by members of the Legislature which adopted the statute, as
to its purpose and the construction intended to be given by the Legislature to its terms,
is not competent evidence upon which the court can make its determination as to the
meaning of the statutory provision.
North Carolina Milk Comm'n v. National Food Stores, Inc., 270 N.C. 323, 332-33, 154 S.E.2d
548, 555 (1967).
"'Lamm v. Crumpler, 233 N.C. 717, 65 S.E.2d 336 (1951); Smith v. Greenlee, 13 N.C. 126
(1829).
'See United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
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ANTITRUST
TerritorialArrangements

Territorial arrangements may be horizontal or vertical. In a horizontal arrangement, actual or potential competitors may agree not to
compete by dividing markets. The division may relate solely to a geographic market, or there may be a product division, a division of customers, or a combination of these. A vertical division may be between a
seller and a buyer or between a supplier who retains title to the goods
and a distributor who is an agent or consignee of the supplier. Vertical
arrangements fall into three categories: (1) the seller or supplier agrees
not to sell or to supply another in a territory assigned to a buyer or
agent; (2) the buyer or agent agrees not to promote or to make sales in
the territory assigned to another; and (3) the buyer or agent agrees not
to sell to anyone who resides outside his assigned territory.
(1)

HorizontalDivision of Markets

Prior to 1907 there was no statutory provision in North Carolina
concerning horizontal division of markets. The legality of such arrangements was determined under the common law. In Culp v. Love,"' decided in 1900, the North Carolina Supreme Court refused to enforce a
contract in which the parties had agreed not to compete with each other
for a specified number of months in the sale of flour and other commodities in several counties. The court sated that the intent of the parties was
immaterial and that the contract was against public policy."' This case
has continuing vitality inasmuch as secion 75-2, enacted in 1913, provides that any contract in restraint of trade which violates the principles
of the common law is a violation of section 75-1.
When Shute v. Shute12 was decided in 1918, there was a specific
statutory provision dealing with division of territories. Section 755(b)(6), first enacted in 1907, makes the following unlawful:
While engaged in buying or selling any goods in this State, to have any
agreement or understanding, express or implied, with any other person
not to buy or sell such goods within certain territorial limits within the
110127 N.C. 457, 37 S.E. 476 (1900).
1'd. at 461-62, 37 S.E. at 477-78. The court also concluded that the contract was a fraud on
a third party. The manufacturer of "Sweetwater" flour shifted its agency from defendant to
plaintiff at defendant's request. Defendant, however, did not inform the manufacturer of the agreement not to compete. Id. at 461, 37 S.E. at 477.
112176 N.C. 462, 97 S.E. 392 (1918).
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State, with the intention of preventing competition in selling or- to fix

or prevent competition in buying such goods within these
the price
limits. 113
In Shute plaintiff sold defendant a cotton gin and agreed that for ten
years he would not compete with defendant south of Bear Skin Creek
in the business of ginning or buying cotton seed and seed cotton. The
contract further provided that defendant, the buyer, would not compete
with plainiff, the seller, north of Bear Skin Creek during a like period.
Plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant from erecting a gin north of Bear
Skin Creek in violation of the contract. The North Carolina Supreme
Court quickly discerned that the agreement was not the usual ancillary
restraint of trade designed to protect the good will purchased by the
vendee. This contract involved a division of territory, and the court
dismissed the suit on the ground that it violated section 75-5(b)(6), the
common law, and section 75-1.
In Maola Ice Cream Co. v. Maola Milk & Ice Cream Co.,"' the
North Carolina Supreme Court reached the high water mark in expressing its disdain for division of territories. The plaintiff owned the trademark "Maola" and sold ice cream manufactured in two plants-one in
Washington, North Carolina and the other in New Bern. There was a
well-defined division of territory as between the two plants. When plaintiff sold the New Bern plant to defendant, an agreement was made that
the trademark "Maola," partially assigned to defendant, should be used
by defendant in a territory to the south of Vanceboro, the territory
theretofore served by the New Bern plant. When defendant began to
distribute dairy products under the name "Maola" from a dairy north
of Vanceboro, plaintiff alleged unfair competition and sought a restraining order. The court decided that the restriction on the defendant's
mark, "Maola," was invalid as a division of territory. The court emphasized that it was not shown that plaintiff had sold ice cream products in
all of Eastern North Carolina north of Vanceboro before the sale of the
"'N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 75-5(b)(6) (1965) does not apply to ancillary restraints of trade unless

they are employed to "monopolize any given business, or the sale of any article, within the territory

named." Wooten v. Harris, 153 N.C. 43, 46, 68 S.E. 898, 899 (1910). An agreement by a grantor
at the time of sale that he will not permit the sale or advertising of petroleum products on a four

acre tract of retained land for a period of twenty-five years does not violate this statute. Quadro
Stations, Inc. v. Gilley, 7 N.C. App. 227, 172 S.E.2d 237 (1970).

1"238 N.C. 317, 77 S.E.2d 910 (1953). See also Steed & Hunter, Trade-Mark Assignments
and Restraintsof Trade: The Maola Ice Cream Case, 33 N.C.L. REv. 399 (1955).
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New Bern plant and thus the agreement would suppress and stifle competition.
The court indicated that plaintiff might have been successful had
defendant signed an agreement not to compete with plaintiff in the area
served by plaintiff's retainedplant at the time the partial assignment of
the trademark was made. This seems too harsh because the restriction
related solely to the use of the trademark "Maola." It did not preclude
the assignee from selling ice cream products under another name in any
locality. Consequently, a restriction on the use of the trademark by the
partial assignee unrelated to the area served by the retained plant should
not be prohibited. Such a restriction would not have such serious adverse
affects on competition as occur in a horizontal division of territories
when no competition at all is permitted between the parties.
The jurisdictional sweep of the Sherman Act is extensive. In Burke
v. Ford115 the lower federal court held that a state-wide division of markets-both territories and brands-by wholesalers of liquor in Oklahoma did not affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come within the
scope of the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court of the United States
reversed and had the following to say:
Horizontal territorial divisions almost invariably reduce competition
among the participants . . . When competition is reduced, prices increase and unit sales decrease. The wholesalers' territorial division here
almost surely resulted in fewer sales to retailers-hence fewer purchases
from out-of-state distillers [there were no liquor distilleries in Oklahoma]-than would have occurred had free competition prevailed
among the wholesalers. In addition the wholesalers' division of brands
meant fewer wholesale outlets available to any one out-of-state distiller.
market division inevitably affected
Thus the state-wide wholesalers'
116
interstate commerce.
Since market-splitting among competitors-whether keyed to geography, products, or customers--completely eliminates competition among
the parties, it is more anticompetitive than a price-fixing agreement.
Such an agreement is likely to fall under the unreasonable-per se rule
117
and thus be illegal under section one of the Sherman Act.
"1246 F. Supp. 403 (N.D. Okla. 1965), affd 377 F.2d 901 (10th Cir. 1967).
"'Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321-22 (1967) (per curiam) (footnotes omitted).
" A horizontal division of territories is a per se violation of the Sherman Act whether or not
the arrangement contains other restraints such as price-fixing. United States v. Topco Associates,
40 U.S.L.W. 4343 (U.S. March 29, 1972).
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Vertical"'
(a) Exclusive Selling

Ordinarily a seller is free to select his customers and to refuse to
deal with others. Hence a seller may establish an exclusive dealership in
a specified territory. Section 75-4 requires a writing for such an agreement to be enforceable by the buyer."' The seller is usually free to shift
from one dealer to another at the end of the contract period.'20 At first
blush section 75-5(b)(6) appears to outlaw an exclusive selling arrangement.' 2' However, in Mar-HofCo. v. Rosenbacker,2 2 the court resorted
to the rule of reason and upheld a seller's agreement to deal only with
the defendant buyer in Winston-Salem.2' On this point the United
States Supreme Court recently stated:
[A] manufacturer of a product other and equivalent brands of which
are readily available in the market may select his customers, and for
this purpose he may "franchise" certain dealers to whom, alone, he
will sell his goods. Cf. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300
(1919). If the restraint stops at that point-if nothing more is involved
than vertical "confinement" of the manufacturer's own sales of the
merchandise to selected dealers, and if competitive products are readily
available to others, the restriction, on these facts alone, would not
violate the Sherman Act.2 A
In the absence of evidence of monopolization, or an attempt to monopolize, or another illegal purpose such as price-fixing, an exclusive selling
arrangement will be upheld as a reasonable restraint of trade under
North Carolina and federal antitrust laws.
"'See generily Day, Exclusive Territorial Arrangements under the Antitrust Laws-A
Reappraisal,40 N.C.L. REv.223 (1961).
"'Radio Electronics Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 244 N.C. 114, 92 S.C.2d 664 (1965).
'Under The Automobile Dealer Franchise Act of 1956, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1970), an
automobile manufacturer may be liable if there is a lack of good faith in refusing to renew a
franchise contract.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-5(b)(6) (1965). The statute is set forth at p. 221 supra.
1-176 N.C. 330,97 S.E. 169 (1918).

'"An automobile franchise agreement providing for an exclusive dealership in a specified
territory was upheld in Waldron Buick Co. v. General Motors Corp., 254 N.C. 117, 118 S.E.2d
559 (1961).
'United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 376 (1967).

1972]

ANTITRUST

(b) Closed Territoriesand CustomerLimitations
An exclusive selling arrangement binds the seller (manufacturer)
not to sell to another buyer (dealer) in a specified territory. The buyer
(dealer) is not prevented by an exclusive selling arrangement from making sales outside his territory. To try to prevent a buyer (dealer) from
selling in the territory of another buyer (dealer) the seller (manufacturer)
may extract from each of his buyers (dealers) a promise to sell only in
his assigned territory. Intra-brand competition can be further reduced
if the seller (manufacturer) can impose on the buyer (dealer) a limitation
to sell only to customers who reside in his territory.
In Waldron Buick Co. v. General Motors Corp.,'2 plaintiff, a
"franchised" Buick dealer in Concord, sought treble damages against
General Motors Corporation and a "franchised" Buick dealer in Charlotte, alleging that he had been forced by defendants to cease sales
activities in the Charlotte area. General Motors had an exclusive selling
arrangement with both plaintiff and defendant dealers in Concord and
Charlotte respectively. However, neither dealer had entered into a
"closed-territory" agreement, which would have bound the dealer to sell
only in his assigned territory. The court, in affirming a judgment of
involuntary nonsuit, in effect upheld a "closed-territory" agreement
that was not actually there. The court reasoned that the agreement of
General Motors to sell only to the Charlotte dealer in the Charlotte area
meant that the Charlotte dealer and General Motors had a right to keep
the Concord dealer from selling in the Charlotte area. A possible inference to be drawn from this decision is that closed-territory agreements,
like exclusive selling agreements, are reasonable restraints. If so, a
strange situation would be created in the law on division of territories.
North Carolina law is harsh on horizontal divisions. 2 1 Clearly, if the
Concord and Charlotte dealers (owners of automobiles purchased from
General Motors and not agents) had agreed among themselves not to
sell in the other's territory, they would have violated section 75-5(b)(6),
section 75-1, and the common law of this state. Nevertheless, if General
Motors is permitted to impose on its dealers a closed-territory arrangement in connection with an exclusive selling arrangement, the result is-a
horizontal division of territories between the dealers.
The United States Supreme Court considered its first case involving
1-254 N.C. 2 117,
118 S.E.2d 559 (1961).
'"Suprap. 2 1 .
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vertical closed-territory and customer-limitation arrangements two
years after Waldron Buick Co. was decided. In The White Motor Co.
v. United States,'27 the lower court held that these vertical restrictions
were per se violations of the Sherman Act and granted summary judgment. The United States Supreme Court sent the case back for trial
because it concluded that from a summary judgment record it did not
"know enough of the economic and business stuff out of which these
arrangements emerge to be certain."'' 28 United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 2 9 decided four years later, involved a variety of territorial and customer restrictions both on goods sold and goods on consignment. The trial lasted seventy days. Defendant was enjoined from
limiting the territory within which any wholesaler or jobber could sell
any "Schwinn" product that had been purchased from defendant. The
trial court ruled that this arrangement was a division of territory and
was a per se violation of the Sherman Act. No appeal was taken from
this ruling. The trial judge took a different view on customer limitations
and upheld a restriction that confined resale by the distributors to franchised retailers and a restriction on franchised retailers that forbade
them to resell to non-franchised retailers, including discount houses. The
government appealed from this ruling, contending that under the rule of
reason these customer limitations violated the Sherman Act. As to goods
sold, the Supreme Court of the United States had this to say about
territorial and customer restrictions:
Once the manufacturer has parted with title and risk, he has parted
with dominion over the product, and his effort thereafter to restrict
territory or persons to whom the product may be transferred-whether
by explicit agreement or by silent combination or understanding with
his vendee-is a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. 30
The Court indicated that a possible exception to the per se rule on goods
sold might be made for newcomers and failing companies.'
1-372 U.S. 253 (1963).
1131d. at 263.
1-388 U.S. 365 (1967).
11i1d. at 382. In Waldron Buick Co. v. General Motors Corp., 254 N.C. 117, 118 S.E.2d 559
(1961), the North Carolina Supreme Court emphasized the absence of a customer limitation on

the plaintiff.
131388 U.S. at 374. Notwithstanding the broad sweep of the per se rule, the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit held that a customer restriction on a product designed for professional use
should be tested by the rule of reason. Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970).
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Is an owner of goods free to impose territorial and customer restrictions on his agent or consignee? Such restrictions are not per se legal
32
but, according to the Court, will be examined under the rule of reason.
In Arnold, Schwinn & Co. these restrictions were found to be reasonable
because the agents and consignees were permitted to obtain bicycles
from competing firms, and there was no evidence of resale price control.
C.

Exclusive Arrangements

Bargains to deal exclusively with another are almost universally
upheld at common law unless they effect or form part of a plan to effect
a monopoly.13 The common law view still prevails in North Carolina
and under federal law in respect to exclusive selling arrangements.' 34 A
seller may bind himself to sell to a particular buyer or a particular class
of buyers. As previously discussed, this includes an agreement by a seller
to sell to only one buyer in a specified locality. 3 Such a limitation on
the seller often appears in so-called franchise agreements. On the other
hand, serious antitrust problems arise when a buyer gets involved in an
arrangement in which he is bound to deal only with the seller. Statutes
that specifically treat exclusive dealing restrictions on buyers are section
75-5(b)(2) of the General Statutes and section three 36 of the Clayton
Act. 3 7 Further, General Statutes sections 75-1 3 and 75-1.1,131 section
one of the Sherman Act, 4 0 and section five of the Federal Trade Commission Act 41 may also apply.
(1) Restriction on a Buyer
(a)

Exclusive Buying

Section 75-5(b)(2) provides that it is unlawful for any person to do
'United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &Co., 388 U.S. 365, 380 (1967).
§ 516(e) (1932).
!uMar-Hof Co. v. Rosenbacker, 176 N.C. 330, 97 S.E. 169 (1918); Waldron Buick Co. v.
General Motors Corp., 254 N.C. 117, 118 S.E.2d 559 (1961); United States v. Bausch & Lomb
Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.. 388 U.S. 365, 376
333RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS

(1967).
"-See section IV, B, (2)(a) of the text supra p. 224.
'uN.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-5(b)(6) (1965).

1-15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).

"-N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 75-1 (1965).

"3id.§ 75-1.1 (Supp. 1971).
14015 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).

1'Id. § 45.
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directly or indirectly or to have any contract expressly or knowingly
implied "[t]o sell any goods in this State upon condition that the purchaser thereof shall not deal in the goods of a competitor or rival in the
business of the person making such sales."'4
Unlike section 75-5(b)(6), there is no requirement of intent or other
qualifying feature in section 75-5(b)(2); therefore, the rule of reason that
applies in the former has no application in the latter. 4 3 Standard Fashion Co. v. Grant,44 decided in 1914, was the first case involving he
validity of an exclusive buying contract under section 75-5(b)(2). The
seller sought to recover for patterns delivered to the buyer. Defendant
contended that the contract of sale was invalid inasmuch as it contained
a provision that bound him not to sell any other make of patterns. The
court agreed with defendant and held the contract unenforceable as a
direct violation of section 75-5(b)(2). Because it was not raised in the
record, the court declined to pass on the possibility of the seller collecting
for the patterns on the theory of quantum valebat.
The severity with which the court applies section 75-5(b)(2) is demonstrated in Florsheim Shoe Co. v. Leader Deparment Store, Inc. "'In
that case the seller sued the buyer to recover on an open account for
shoes and an electric sign. The buyer counterclaimed, alleging that the
seller had breached its agreement to sell exclusively to the buyer in
Asheville. The buyer ordinarily would have been entitled to prevail on
the counterclaim;' 46 however, the evidence disclosed that the buyer had
agreed not to sell other shoes within a competitive price range of those
of the seller. Because the buyer's agreement violated section 75-5(b)(2),
the court held the entire contract illegal. The result was that an otherwise
legal exclusive selling provision was unenforceable by the buyer because
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-5(b)(2) (1965). This provision was originally § I(a) of the 1907
Session Laws. Ch. 218, § 1(a), [1907] N.C. Sess. L. 254. It was reenacted as § 1(a) of the 1911
Session Laws, eh. 167, § 1(a), [1911] N.C. Sess. L. 321, and it became § 5(b) of the 1913 Session
Laws. Ch.41, § 5(b), [1913] N.C. Sess. L. 67.
"'In Mar-Hof Co. v. Rosenbacker, 176 N.C. 330, 97 S.E. 169 (1918), the court observed that

§ 75-5(b)(6) permits a standard of reasonableness because it requires a finding of intent. In Florsheim Shoe Co. v. Leader Dep't Store, Inc., 212 N.C. 75, 193 S.E.9 (1937), the court distinguished
the two sections.
"4165 N.C. 453, 81 S.E. 606 (1914).
'"212 N.C. 75, 193 S.E. 9 (1937).
"'Mar-Hof Co. v. Rosenbacker, 176 N.C. 330,97 S.E. 169 (1918).
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of an illegal buying provision in the agreement. In Arey v. Lemons

47 the

owners of land leased the premises rent-free to an oil company for ten
years, and the oil company, as lessee, subleased the same property rent-

free to the owners of the land. The only possible consideration for this
"startling document" was the promise of the oil company to sell to the
owners of the fee its petroleum products and an agreement by the owners
of the fee to handle such products to the exclusion of similar products
of other sellers. The entire agreement was decreed to be void as a clear

violation of section 75-5(b)(2).
In Lewis v. Archbell,18 unlike previous cases, plaintiff was a com-

petitor of the seller. Plaintiff alleged that he had been forced out of
business by an exclusive buying contract for cross ties entered into by

the plaintiff's competitor and the Norfolk and Southern Railroad. The
North Carolina Supreme Court concluded that under the facts of this

case a jury would have to decide whether the railroad had agreed to
refrain from dealing with the defendant seller's competitors. Subsequently, plaintiff proved that the exclusive arrangement actually existed

and that he was injured as a result. He was awarded treble damages.'
The foregoing cases reveal that a promise by a buyer not to deal in

the goods of a competitor of the seller is per se illegal under section 755(b)(2).
Under the federal antitrust laws, exclusive buying arrangements are
usually tested under section three of the Clayton Act. This section
reaches only those exclusive buying arrangements that are reasonably
likely "to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly
in any line of commerce."' 15 Exclusive contracts, whether involving
14232 N.C. 531, 61 S.E.2d 596 (1950). In Grubb Oil Co. v. Garner, 230 N.C. 499, 53 S.E.2d
441 (1949), the pleadings did not allege any agreement that the buyer was not to deal in competftors'
products. The court indicated that if the hearing revealed a sublease with such a restriction as part
of a single transaction, a different situation might arise. As presented by the pleadings, the case
involved a permissible restriction in a lease; that is, the lessor agreed not to sell from the demised
premises or other premises within a radius of two thousand feet any petroleum products other than
those of the lessee.
1'199 N.C. 205, 154 S.E. 11 (1930).
"'Lewis v. Fry, 207 N.C. 852, 175 S.E. 717 (1934).
"'It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use,
consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District
of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United
States, or fix a price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on
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"commodities" or a service, may also violate the Sherman Act and
section five of the Federal Trade Commission Act.' 5'
(b)

Requirements Contracts

It is not uncommon for a buyer to agree to purchase all of his
requirements from a particular seller. This arrangement will foreclose a
market to the competitors of a seller as effectively as a covenant by a
buyer not to deal with a competitor of the seller. A seller should not be
permitted to escape the sanctions of section 75-5(b)(2) by imposing a
requirements contract on the buyer. On the other hand, a buyer may
desire a requirements contract to assure himself a source of supply in
times of scarcity. In such a situation the per se rule of section 75-5(b)(2)
should not apply. Instead, all requirements contracts not designed to
circumvent section 75-5(b)(2) should be examined under sections 75-1
and 75-1.1 and tested for legality under the rule of reason.
Section three of the Clayton Act makes illegal only those requirements contracts which are reasonably likely "to substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." The
meaning of this qualifying clause is often the subject of litigation. A
comparison of two cases decided by the United States Supreme Court,
in which different results were reached, provides some guidance for understanding the qualifying clause as it is applied to requirements contracts. In Standard Oil Co. v. United States,5 2 the Court held that the
requirements contracts of defendant with sixteen percent of the independent service stations in the Western Area (several states) which foreclosed 6.7 percent of the gasoline market in that area were enough to
"substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly" in
violation of section three of the Clayton Act. In Tampa Electric Co. v.
Nashville Coal Co., plaintiff, a public utility, entered into a contract
with defendant, a coal supplier, in which defendant agreed to furnish the
the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not
use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities
of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale,

or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
"'FTC v. Motion Picture Adv. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953).

15337 U.S. 293 (1949). (The defendant's major competitors had similar contracts with other
outlets.)
"-365 U.S. 320 (1961).
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total requirements of plaintiff in certain plants for a period of twenty
years. Before the first delivery was made, defendant advised plaintiff that
it considered the contract illegal under the antitrust laws and refused to
make delivery. The United States Supreme Court in upholding the contract, followed the technique that it had used in Standard Oil to ascertain
the percentage of market foreclosed to the seller's competitors. After
determining that the line of commerce was coal, the Court found that
the relevant market was the area in which the seven hundred producers
of coal in the Appalachians competed with the defendant. This contract,
although involving 128,000,000 dollars over a twenty-year period, nevertheless foreclosed only .77 percent of the market. This percentage of
foreclosure by a contract that offered a public utility the assurance of a
steady and ample supply of fuel was not enough "to substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly."
(c)

Tying Clauses

The usual tying contract forces the customer to take a product or
brand that he does not necessarily wantin order to secure one that he
does desire. 54 Such an arrangement is inherently anticompetitive even if
it is not accompanied by an exclusive arrangement feature. A patentee
or producer of a unique and desirable product is in a powerful position
to impose a tying arrangement. The result is to foreclose to competitors
a market in the tied product as well as to coerce the buyer. Section 755(b)(2) is directed at foreclosing markets, and it should be construed to
cover tying clauses. In any event, most of these arrangements clearly
would be a restraint of trade under section 75-1 and an unfair method
of competition under section 75- 1.1.
The federal courts have taken a harsh attitude toward tying clauses,
and the jurisdictional sweep of the federal statutes is broad enough to
reach most of these clauses. Whether in a sale, lease, or license, the
present rule under both the Clayton Act and Sherman Act is that a tying
arrangement is per se illegal when the tying item, by virtue of either
uniqueness or customer appeal, gives enough power in the tying product
to accomplish the tie-in' and a not insubstantial amount of commerce
in the tied product.15 Unlike in requirements contracts, the dollar vol'Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323-34 (1962).
IONorthern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
"international Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
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ume is the test. In United States v. Loew's Inc.,'5 60,800 dollars was

found to be not insubstantial. In a treble damage suit to determine
whether the amount of commerce foreclosed is sufficient to warrant
prohibition of the practice, the relevent figure is the total volume of sales
tied by the sales policy under challenge and not the portion of this total
accounted for by the plaintiff who brings the treble damage suit. Thus,
if the tied sales to all purchasers made by the defendant is not insubstantial, an individual purchaser may sue for treble damages even though his
purchases amount to only a "fraction" of the tied sales.' 8
Occasionally, the federal courts have accepted a special justification
for a particular tying arrangement. For example, in United States v.
JerroldElectronics Corp.' a tie-in of various items of equipment needed
for a community television antenna plus the servicing of the equipment
by the seller was upheld. The court concluded that the seller had a
legitimate interest in assuring the proper functioning of this complex
equipment in a new industry.
A tie-in involving commodities may be illegal either under section
three of the Clayton Act, 60 section one of the Sherman Act,'' or section
five of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 6 2 Tying arrangements not
involving commodities, and hence not within the coverage of section
three of the Clayton Act, have been attacked successfully under section
one of the Sherman Act. These include tying railway services to leases
of land, 6 3 block-booking of motion pictures for television exhibition,, 6
tying the sale of houses to credit,6 5 and tying cooking equipment and
food items to a franchise agreement involving a trademark license. 65
157371 U.S. 38 (1962).

153Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495,502 (1969).
10187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affdper curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). Other examples
are: Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
931 (1961); Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), petitionfor cert. dismissed, 381
U.S. 125 (1965). But see Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
"lnternational Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).

"'International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). Section 3 of the Clayton Act
and § 1of the Sherman Act were involved.

117l7he Federal Trade Commission may bring proceedings under § 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970), for conduct which violates § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 14 (1970), or § I of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
"'Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
'"United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962).

15Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969), noted in 48

N.C.L. REv.309 (1970).
"'Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,40 U.S.L.W. 3410
(U.S. Feb. 28, 1972).
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Recently, the tie-in concept has been expanded to cover arrangements in which a seller requires a buyer to purchase products of a third
party. In two cases gasoline suppliers violated section five of the Federal
Trade Commission Act by coercing their "dealers" to handle a particular brand of tires, batteries, and accessories of a third party. 8 7 The
gasoline supplier in each instance received a commission from the supplier of the tires, batteries and accessories.
In 1969 the General Assembly dealt specifically with the tie-in concept in a narrow area. Section 75-17 makes it a criminal offense for a
lender of money to require a borrower to insure property that is offered
as security with a particular insurer. 118
(2) Restrictionson Lessees, Licensees, and Franchisees
Section 75-5(b)(2) applies only to buyers. But suppose restrictions
are imposed on lessees, licensees and franchisees? In Knutton v.
Cofield " plaintiff and defendant executed a contract for the installation
of an electric phonograph in defendant's place of business. Defendant
agreed that during the term of the five-year contract he would not permit
the installation of any competing device. After defendant breached this
agreement, plaintiff sued for damages. Defendant demurred on the
ground that the contract violated the laws of the state as a restraint of
trade and was thus void. The court held that this "joint undertaking"
did not violate the antitrust laws. Clearly, section 75-5(b)(2) did not
apply because there was no sale, but the court went on to indicate that
only sales were reached by chapter 75. Contracts in restraint of trade
may involve parties other than a buyer and seller; therefore, it would
have been preferable had the court concluded that the restraint on the
defendant was a reasonable one and did not violate section 75-1.
In FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service, Inc.,'7" a producer
of motion picture advertising films had exclusive contracts with forty
percent of the theater owners in the area in which it operated. Although
section three of the Clayton Act did not apply because no commodity
was involved, the United States Supreme Court held that these exclusive
contracts fell within the prohibitions of the Sherman Act and were,
therefore, an unfair method of competition under section five of the
'"Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965); FTC v.Texaco Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968).
"uN.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-17 (Supp. 197 1). See also id. §§ 75-18, -19.
16273 N.C. 355, 160 S.E.2d 29 (1968).
170334 U.S. 392 (1953).
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Federal Trade Commission Act.
Section five of the Federal Trade Commission Act was adopted as
section 75-1.1 of chapter 75 after the decision in Knutton and should

provide a means of redress for lessees, licensees, and franchisees who are
subjected to unreasonable exclusive dealing arrangements.
D.

Rejusals to Deal
(1) Individual Refjisals to Deal
A businessman may have a variety of commercial and personal

reasons not to deal with another person or firm. Ordinarily, a single
trader may choose not to deal with another without violating the antitrust statutes of North Carolina or of the United States."' However, an
individual refusal to deal, when coupled with other conduct, may fall
into a forbidden category. If done with the intent to destroy or injure
the business of any competitor with the purpose of attempting to fix the
price of any goods when the competition is removed, then the refusal to
deal would amount to a violation of section 75-5(b)(3).111 The refusal of
the only newspaper in a city to deal with advertisers who patronized the

local radio station has been held an attempt to monopolize under section
73
two of the Sherman Act.

When a trader agrees to deal only with certain traders, the effect is
to refuse to deal with all others. Exclusive dealerships whereby the seller

agrees to deal only with a particular distributor in a given locality have
been upheld under both the law of North Carolina' and the federal
'United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). Unless state resale price maintenance
laws are in effect, a seller cannot enforce resale price maintenance by cutting off price cutters
without running a grave risk of violating § I of the Sherman Act. This is due to the fact that the
Supreme Court of the United States has little difficulty in finding a combination in restraint of
trade in this area. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Albrecht v. Herald
Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). The North Carolina law providing for resale-price-maintenance isentitled
the "Fair Trade Act." N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-50 to -57 (1965), as amended, (Supp. 1971). For a
discussion of this Act, see § IV (A), (2) supra p. 218.
1 2
1t is unlawful "for any person directly or indirectly to do or have any contract express or
knowingly implied . .. [t]o willfully destroy or injure, or undertake to destroy or injure, the
business of any competitor or business rival in this State with the purpose of attempting to fix the
price of any goods when the competition is removed." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-5(b)(3) (1965).
InLorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
"'An exclusive dealing arrangement in which the seller agrees to deal only with a buyer in a
specified locality appears to be proscribed by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-5(b)(6) (1965), but, by applying the rule of reason, the court upheld such an arrangement in Mar-Hof Co. v. Rosenbacker, 176
N.C. 330, 97 S.E. 169 (1918). The legality of this type of exclusive dealing arrangement was
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law. 1 75 On the other hand, a seller cannot extract from a buyer a promise
not to deal with a competitor of the seller without running afoul of an
express provision of the North Carolina antitrust law. 76 Likewise, such
an arrangement is proscribed by federal law when a seller makes a sale
on condition that the buyer will not deal in the goods of a competitor
and its effect may be "to substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce." 177
(2) Concerted Refisals to Deal
There is no specific statutory provision in either the North Carolina
or federal antitrust laws that governs concerted refusals to deal. Under
federal law such conduct is considered a restraint of trade in violation
of section one of the Sherman Act and an unfair method of competition
under section five of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The North
Carolina Supreme Court has handed down decisions on concerted refusals to deal that are not consistent with its own views in other antitrust
cases. Further, federal precedents in this area are yet to be considered
by this court in the interpretation of sections 75-1 and 75-1.1.
In Rice v. Asheville Ice Co., 78 plaintiff sued for damages under the
antitrust laws, alleging that defendants refused to sell ice to him and thus
prevented him from engaging in the business of retailing ice in the Asheville area. In a per curiam opinion, the North Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed a dismissal of the action apparently on the ground that plaintiff
could not show any damages. The court did not consider whether there
was a concert of action by defendants and, if so, whether it would
constitute a restraint of trade under section 75-1.
reaffirmed in Waldron Buick Co. v. General Motors Corp., 254 N.C. 117, 118 S.E.2d 559 (1961).
See Section IV (B)(2) supra p. 224.
'United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944). In United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 376 (1967), the Court by way of dictum stated: "[A]
manufacturer of a product other and equivalent brands of which are readily available in the market
may select his customers, and for this purpose he may 'franchise' certain dealers to whom, alone,

he will sell his goods."
1
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-5(b)(2) (1965).
177Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970). This Act extends to leases, contracts to sell, and
to sales, whereas § 75-5(b)(2) is confined to sales.
178204
N.C. 768, 169 S.E. 707 (1933). The court relied on Lewis v. Archbll, 199 N.C. 205,
154 S.E. 11 (1930). Further, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-5(b)(3) (1965) was held inapplicable on the

ground that plaintiff was not a competitor of defendants. Plaintiff, of course, was trying to buy
from defendants in order to compete with them at the retail level inasmuch as they were also
retailers. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (Supp. 1971), enacted in 1969, has a provision which does not
require the defendant to be in competition with the plaintiff. See section V, C infra 251.
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In 1941 two cases involving concered refusals to deal were decided
7 1 plaintiff,
by the North Carolina Supreme Court. In McNeill v. Hall,1
an operator of a cafe, was forced to go out of business because he was
unable to secure supplies from salesmen representing baking houses and
packing houses that served the village of Micaville. The salesmen ceased
to sell to plaintiff because a combination of retail businessmen threatened to withhold patronage from the salesmen should they continue to
sell to plaintiff. Plaintiff suffered a nonsuit in the trial court, and the
North Carolina Supreme Court, in affirming, stated:
The gravamen of the action alleged is a boycott of the plaintiffs'
business. A requisite of any boycott is a conspiracy. Boycott is defined
by Black's Law Dictionary (Second Edition) as "a conspiracy formed
and intended directly or indirectly to prevent the carrying on of any
lawful business . . ." A conspiracy is "an agreement between two or
more individuals to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act in an
unlawful way." The determination of the defendants to decline to buy
from the salesmen if they continued to sell to the plaintiffs was not an
unlawful act. It was simply the exercise of the right they had to buy
from or to refrain from buying from whomsoever they pleased. "If
these acts are not wrongful or illegal, no agreement to commit them
can properly be called an illegal and wrongful conspiracy." S. v. Martin, 191 N.C.,404, 132 S.E., 16.
In the absence of intimidation and coercion, and in a peaceable
manner, a person has a right to endeavor to prevent other firms procuring certain articles to be sold in competition with the sale of the same
articles by them in a given territory.1 0
In Lineberger v. Colonial Ice Co.,'8 1 a retailer of ice alleged violations
of sections 75-1 and 75-5(b)(6).112 He contended that by concerted action
all six manufacturers of ice in the area refused to sell to him. Paragraph
eight of the complaint stated:
[t]hat immediately after refusing to sell ice to the plaintiff, as a
part of said conspiracy and in furtherance thereof, and to procure for
themselves the unlawful gain from the plaintiff's established business,
the said conspirators employed the plaintiff's drivers and helpers to
point out to them all of the plaintiff's customers and the various routes
17220 N.C. 73, 16 S.E.2d 456 (1941).
"'Id.at 74, 16 S.E.2d at 457.
181220 N.C. 444, 17 S.E.2d 502 (1941).
2
18
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-5(b)(6) is discussed in section IV (B)(I) supra p. 221.
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upon which said customers resided, and did thereafter and now continues to sell said customers to the loss of the said plainiff and the
unlawful enrichment of said defendants.18
The complaint survived a demurrer in the trial court, but the North
Carolina Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion, reversed, declaring
that the suit involved a controversy of a private nature and hence no
public interest was involved.
A brief summary of federal cases will reveal a sharp contrast to
these decisions of the North Carolina Supreme Court. As early as 1904
the United States Supreme Court ruled that a concerted refusal by
traders to deal with other traders violated secion one of the Sherman
Act.8 4 In 1914 in Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United
States, 5' an agreement by a group of retailers not to deal with wholesalers who sold directly to consumers was held to be unlawful as an unreasonable restraint of trade. The Supreme Court repeated the following
from a decision in which it had upheld the Supreme Court of Mississippi
in a similar interpretation of the Mississippi Antitrust Statute:
An act harmless when done by one may become a public wrong when
done by many acting in concert, for it then takes on the form of a
conspiracy, and may be prohibited or punished, if the result be hurtful
to the public or to the individual against whom the concertedaction is
directed.'s

Later, the Supreme Court declared that group boycotts (concerted re87
fusal by traders to deal with other traders) were unreasonable per se.1
In Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,18 8 plaintiff, a small retailer, sued for treble damages and for an injunction under the federal
antitrust laws. He alleged that a chain store outlet located next door had
induced several suppliers to boycott him or to sell to him only on unfavorable terms. The lower federal courts dismissed the complaint on the
ground that the controversy was a purely private quarrel between Klor's
and Broadway Hale that did not amount to a public wrong proscribed
mRecord at 5.
IuMontague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904).
1-234 U.S. 600 (1914).
186d. at 614, quoting Grenada Lumber Co. v. Mississippi, 217 U.S. 433,440-41 (1909) (emphasis added).
'"Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,5 (1958), citing Fashion Originators' Guild
of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
1-359 U.S. 207 (1959).
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by the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court, in rejecting this view, stated:
Group boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other
traders, have long been held to be-in the forbidden category. They have
not been saved by allegations that they were reasonable in the specific
circumstances, nor by a failure to show that they "fixed or regulated
prices, parcelled out or limited production, or brought about a deterioration in quality." Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457, 466, 467-468. CY: United States v. Trenton
Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392. Even when they operated to lower prices
or temporarily to stimulate competition they were banned. For, as this
Court said in Kieler-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211,
213, "such agreements, no less than those to fix minimum prices,
cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell
in accordance with their own judgment." C United States v. Patten,
226 U.S. 525, 542.
Plainly the allegations of this complaint disclose such a boycott.
This is not a case of a single trader refusing to deal with another, nor
even of a manufacturer and a dealer agreeing to an exclusive distributorship. Alleged in this complaint is a wide combination consisting of
manufacturers, distributors and a retailer. This combination takes
from Klor's its freedom to buy appliances in an open market and drives
it out of business as a dealer in the defendants' products. It deprives
the manufacturers and distributors of their freedom to sell to Klor's
at the same prices and conditions made available to Broadway-Hale,
and in some instances forbids them from selling to it on any terms
whatsoever. It interferes with the natural flow of interstate commerce.
It clearly has, by its "nature" and "character," a "monopolistic tendency." As such it is not to be tolerated merely because the victim is
just one merchant whose business is so small that his destruction makes
little difference to the economy. Monopoly can as surely thrive by the
elimination of such small businessmen, one at a time, as it can by
driving them out in large groups." 9
In Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co.,'"0 the United
States Supreme Court, relying on its decision in Klors, held in a per
curiam opinion that it was error for the district court to dismiss for
failure to state a claim a complaint alleging that defendant trade association and its members had violated section one of the Sherman Act by
111d. at 212-13 (footnotes omitted).

1-364 U.S. 656 (1961).
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establishing and enforcing "capricious and arbitrary" standards for gas
burners which plaintiff's quality burners could not meet and thus effectively excluding plaintiff as a competitor.
A combination of businessmen that exerts economic power to injure
or destroy another businessman wields the same kind of power as the
"trusts" that brought about the enactment of antitrust laws. The public
interest is served when a competitor is protected from the evils of monopoly power whether it be exercised by a "trust" or a group. There is
no more effective way to victimize a businessman than to make him the
object of a group boycott. Economic coercion through combinations and
conspiracies is what section one of the Sherman Act is about. North
Carolina can make its counterpart, section 75-1, a viable statute in this
area by following federal precedents. Group boycotts are also a violation
of section five of the Federal Trade Commission Act.19 Since this provision was adopted as section 75-1.1 of the North Carolina antitrust statute in 1969, it provides an opportunity for a new approach in dealing
with this type of concerted action. To cope effectively with group boycotts does not require the adoption of a per se rule. 92 All that is needed
is to eliminate the obstacles erected in McNeill v. Hal'93 and Lineberger
"'Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
1"2The per se rule is not uniformly applied in the federal courts. In Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062
(1970) two suppliers dealing with distributor A agreed with B to shift to B. This arrangement was
found to be reasonable under the circumstances. In Instant Delivery Corp. v. City Stores Co., 284
F. Supp. 941, 947 (E.D. Pa. 1968), four retailers had been using a single delivery service. They
changed to two different services and then returned to a single service. The complaining carrier who
lost out in the bidding was found to be "a disappointed competitor, not the object of an illegal
boycott." In Dalmo Sales Co. v. Tysons Corner Regional Shopping Center, 308 F. Supp. 988
(D.D.C. 1970), the per se rule was rejected in considering a provision in a long-term lease that gave
certain lessees the right to select and approve tenants who in the judgment of these lessees would
contribute to the success of the enterprise.
19'220 N.C. 73, 16 S.E.2d 456 (1941). The court quoted the following from 15 C.J.S.
Conspiracy § 12g (1939): "'It has been held that a combination of retail dealers in merchandise,
which for a legitimate purpose interferes with another's right to buy goods by persuasion or other
peaceful means exerted against the sellers, does not amount to an actionable conspiracy, there being
no intimidation or coercion.'" Id. at 74-75, 16 S.E.2d 457. This statement is supported in Corpus
JurisSecundum by a single lower federal court case decided in 1907: Montgomery Ward & Co. v.
South Dakota Retail Merchants' & Hardware Dealers' Ass'n, 150 F. 413 (C.C.S.D. 1907). A later
edition of C.J.S. gives a broader meaning to boycott by requiring intimidation, although it may be
passive. 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy § 12a (1967).
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v. Colonial Ice Co.'94 and then to consider each case on its merits under
the rule of reason.
E. Monopolization, Attempt to Monopolize, Combination or Conspiracy to Monopolize
The North Carolina antitrust statute has no provision with language similar to section two of the Sherman Act:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor ...."I
However, section 75-5(b)(3) covers some of the same ground. It makes
it unlawful for any person to do directly or indirectly, or have any
contract express or knowingly implied to "willfully destroy or injure, or
undertake to destroy or injure, the business of any competitor or business rival in this State with the purpose of attempting to fix the price of
any goods when the competition is removed."' 96 One similarity to be
noted at the outset is that both statutes are directed at individual misconduct as well as at concerted action. Two North Carolina cases illustrate
the application of section 75-5(b)(3) to an individual. In Smith v. Morganton Ice Co.,"97 defendant, the owner of an ice plant in Morganton,
secured a monopoly of the ice business in Morganton by a series of acts
that froze out plaintiff, a competitor at the retail level. Defendant first
procured an agreement with the Deaf and Dumb School in Morganton,
a manufacturer of ice, not to sell ice to anyone. Defendant then procured
agreements with ice plants in neighboring towns not to sell ice to plaintiff
unless he would agree to resell at a minimum price in Morganton of fifty
cents per one hundred pounds. Plaintiff was buying ice from a plant in
194220 N.C. 444, 17 S.E.2d 502 (1941) (no public interest involved). But see Lewis v. Archbell,
199 N.C. 205, 154 S.E. 11 (1930); Lewis v. Frye, 207 N.C. 852, 175 S.E. 698 (1935) (treble damages
awarded when plaintiff injured by an exclusive buying contract between plaintiff's former customer

and a competitor).
1215 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).

"'N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 75-5(b)(3) (1965). This section was enacted in 1907. Ch. 218, § 1(b),

[1907] N.C. Sess. L. 254. In 1911 it was restricted to "circulating false reports" and thus severely
narrowed in scope. Ch. 167, § 1(b), [1911] N.C. Sess. L. 321. In 1913 the languge of the 1907 Act
was restored. Ch. 41, § 5(c), [1913] N.C. Sess. L. 66. The present version was held to be constitutional in State v. Atlantic Ice & Coal Co., 210 N.C. 742, 188 S.E. 412 (1936).
1159 N.C. 151, 74 S.E. 961 (1912).
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Newton for 17.5 cents per hundred pounds and reselling it for a profit
at thirty-five cents. Defendant threatened the Newton supplier with a
trade war. As a result, the Newton supplier ceased dealing with plaintiff.
Defendant was successful in securing a monopoly and thereafter sold its
ice for fifty cents per one hundred pounds in Morganton. Plaintiff recovered damages under the common law and under a 1907 antitrust
statutory provision that is now section 75-5(b)(3). Jurisdictional considerations aside, defendant in this case would be guilty of "monopolizing"
under section two of the Sherman Act. In State v. Atlantic Ice & Coal
Co.,' 98 defendant, a Georgia corporation, was convicted of and fined one
thousand dollars for violating section 75-5(b)(3). Defendant, the largest
of approximately twenty-five coal dealers in Winston-Salem, had drastically cut the price of coal. The justification offered for this action by the
president of defendant corporation was that he wanted sales and that
there already were too many coal dealers in Winston-Salem. There was
no evidence that any of defendant's competitors had been driven out of
business; nevertheless, the court stated:
It goes without saying that reducing the price of coal to the consumer below what the defendant paid for same, with the other evidence
above set forth, is sufficient evidence to be submitted to the jury that
defendant formed a purpose to monopolize, and willfully undertook to
injure its competitors."9
Defendant, in effect, was convicted of an attempt to monopolize. This
offense is specifically set forth in section two of the Sherman Act.
Three cases have come before the North Carolina Supreme Court
involving an alleged conspiracy in violation of section 75-5(b)(3).210 In
each case the plaintiff was a truck carrier that was suing several railroads for combining to lower rates to injure truck carriers with the intent
to restore the rates at a later time. The lowering of rates by railroads is
now within the jurisdiction of the Utilities Commission, 2 ' but at the time
these three cases were litigated, the Utilities Commissioner had jurisdiction over the raising of but not the lowering of such rates. Three impor193210 N.C. 742, 188 S.E. 412 (1936).
"'Id.at 753, 188 S.E. at 419.

2'Carolina Motor Serv., Inc. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 210 N.C. 36, 185 S.E. 479 (1936);
Bennett v. Southern Ry., 211 N.C. 474, 191 S.E. 240 (1937); Patterson v. Southern Ry., 214 N.C.
38, 198 S.E. 364 (1938).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-32 (Supp. 1971).
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tant points in these cases, nevertheless, have continuing vitality in the
antitrust laws. First, although private persons or corporations may sue
for damages, injunctive relief is not available to them under the antitrust
provisions which subject them to criminal prosecution.2 12 Second, the
fixing of rates is within the definition of "goods" under section 75-5.211
Third, the fact that the rate agreement had been to lower the price of
gasoline to consumers did not constitute a defense under section 755(b)(3) because this section is not subject to the rule of reason.2 4 In
Sherman Act terms the defendants in each of these cases would have
been charged with a combination or a conspiracy to monopolize.
Because the language of section 75-5(b)(3) and that of section two
of the Sherman Act differ so widely, a summary of the cases under the
federal act will not be undertaken. 25 Nevertheless, the jurisdictional
sweep of section two of the Sherman Act to reach local attempts to
monopolize should be emphasized. In Lorain Journal Co. v. United
States,2 1 a newspaper publisher was enjoined from attempting to monopolize the advertising business in Lorain, Ohio by refusing to accept
local advertising from any business that patronized the local radio station. The defendant operated the only newspaper in the city. This decision makes it clear that a business practice designed to destroy a competitor in a single locality which would, if successful, achieve a monopoly
and which, though falling short, nevertheless approaches so close as to
create a dangerous probability of achieving a monopoly is an attempt
to monopolize under section two of the Sherman Act.
F. PricingPolicies Designed to Injure or Destroy Competitors
Sections 75-5(b)(4) and (5) have the obvious purpose of protecting
the weak businessman from certain pricing practices of a powerful
rival. 2 1Section 75-5(b)(4) makes the following conduct unlawful:
24Carolina Motor Serv., Inc. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 210 N.C. 36, 39, 185 S.E. 479,481
(1936).
OBennett v. Southern Ry., 21! N.C. 474, 191 S.E. 240 (1937) (suit for damages).
2mPatterson v. Southern Ry., 214 N.C. 38, 198 S.E. 364 (1938).

mIllustrative recent cases involving monopolization and conspiracies to monopolize are United
States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); International Boxing Club v. United States, 358
U.S. 242 (1959); United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours &Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
-342 U.S. 143 (1951). See generally Hiber, Attempts to Monopolize: A Concept in Search
ofAnalysis, 34 ANTrrRUST L.J. 165 (1967).

N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-5(b)(4), (5) (1965). Both sections were, in substance, first enacted
in 1907. Ch. 218, §§ 1(c), (d), [1907] N.C. Sess. L. 254.
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While engaged in buying or selling any goods within the State, through
himself or together with or through any allied, subsidiary or dependent
person, to injure or destroy or undertake to injure or destroy the business of any rival or competitor, by unreasonably raising the -price of
any goods bought or by unreasonably lowering the price of any goods
sold with the purpose of increasing the profit on the business when such
rival or competitor is driven out of business, or his business is injured.

In State v. Atlantic Ice & Coal Co.,2°5 the trial judge ruled that this
section was so indefinite that its enforcement would violate the due
process clause of the Federal and State Constitutions. In this case the
North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the conviction under section 755(b)(3) and thus did not review the ruling of the lower court on section
75-5(b)(4). State and federal courts have considerable experience in deciding what is an unreasonable restraint of trade. To determine what is
an unreasonable lowering or raising of prices should pose less difficulty
for the courts.
In 1936 Congress adopted the substance of the Borah-Van Nuys
Bill by enacting section three of the Robinson-Patman Act.2 19 Its provisions concerning pricing practices of sellers are broader than section 75210
5(b)(4), but unlike the North Carolina law, it does not apply to buyers.
A clause in section three of the Robinson-Patman Act makes it a crime
"to sell . . .goods at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of de-210 N.C. 742, 188 S.E. 412 (1936).
'Act of June 19, 1936, ch. 592, § 3, 49 Stat. 1528. The Borah-Van Nuys bill is § 3 of the
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1970).
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to be a party to, or assist in, any transaction of sale, or contract to sell, which
discriminates to his knowledge against competitors of the purchaser, in that, any discount, -rebate, allowance, or advertising service charge is granted to tfhe purchaser over
and above any discount, rebate, allowance, or advertising service charge available at the
time of such transaction to said competitors in respect of a sale of goods of like grade,
quality, and quantity; to sell, or contract to sell, goods in any part of the United States
at prices lower than those exacted by said person elsewhere in the United States for the
purpose of destroying competition, or eliminating a competitor in such part of the United
States; or, to sell, or contract to sell, goods at unreasonably low prices for the purpose
of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor.
Any person violating any of the provisions of this section shall, upon conviction
thereof, be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
15 U.S.C. § 13a (1970).
21
1A buyer might be reached under § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, under the attempt
to monopolize clause or under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1),
under the unfair method of competition clause.
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stroying competition or eliminating a competitor." In United States v.
Natinal Dairy Products Corp.,

"

the United States Supreme Court held

this clause to be constitutional. The Court made it clear that all sales
below cost do not violate section three. Only those sales made below cost
without legitimate commercial objective (such as meeting the price of a
competitor) and with specific intent to destroy competition would be
covered. Only a few cases have been prosecuted under this section.,'
Contrary to provisions in the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, treble
damage relief is not available under section three of the RobinsonPatman Act. 21 3 On the other hand, section 75-5(b)(4) subjects a violator
to both criminal prosecution and to a suit for treble damages.
Section 75-5(b)(5) is a price discrimination statute, and, like section
75-5 (b)(4), it reaches individual as well as concerted conduct. It makes
unlawful the following conduct:
While engaged in dealing in goods within this State, at a place where
there is competition, to sell such goods at a price lower than is charged
by such person for the same thing at another place, when there is not
good and sufficient reason on account of transportation or the expense
of doing business for charging less at the one place than at the other,
or to give away such goods, with a view to injuring the business of
another."'
In State v. Atlantic Ice & Coal Co., 2 15 the jury found an individual
defendant guilty of violating this section. On appeal the conviction was
upheld under section 75-5(b)(3), and the North Carolina Supreme Court
did not consider the count involving section 75-5 (b)(5). In another case,
the court upheld a ruling of the trial court that had sustained charges in
the complaint of violations of sections 75-5(b)(3) and (5) against several
defendants.21 6 Other than as involved in these two cases section 755(b)(5) as well as section 75-5 (b)(4) remain as virtually dead provisions
in the antitrust statute. Enforcement of federal price discrimination statutes has been more effective.
211372 U.S. 29 (1963).
212

The maximum fine under § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act is five thousand dollars, 15
U.S.C. § 13a (1970), whereas, since 1955, the maximum fine under the Sherman Act is fifty
thousand dollars. Id. §§ 1-3 (1970).
213
Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958).
211
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-5(b)(5) (1965).
215210 N.C. 742, 188 S.E. 412 (1936).
2"Bennett v. Southern Ry., 211 N.C. 474, 191 S.E. 240 (1937).
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Section two of the Clayton Act, passed in 1914,217 was designed to
prohibit the destruction of competition through price discrimination.
Congress desired to provide more protection for small businessmen, and,
in 1936, it enacted the Robinson-Patman Act as an amendment to sectioi two of the Clayton .Act.218 Section two, as amended, has five subsec-

tions-(a) through

(f).219

These subsections are too lengthy to be reprod-

uced. Summarized, the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits a seller from
discriminating in prices charged for goods of like grade and quality if
such discrimination causes the requisite probable competitive injury,
unless the discrimination is permissible under one of the several defenses
(such as cost defense and good faith in meeting the price of a competitor)
found in various parts of subsections (a) and (b). Payments of brokerage
and similar allowances to buyers are regulated by subsection (c), which
makes such payments in violation of the section illegal per se.
Subsections (d) and (e) prohibit promotional allowances and services not
made available or accorded to all competing customers or purchasers
on proportionally equal terms. The only defense in these two subsections
is a good faith meeting of competition. Buyers are covered under subsection (c) in the brokerage clause and in subsection (f), which prohibits
buyers from knowingly inducing or receiving a discriminatory price
which the seller is forbidden to grant under subsection (a). There is no
provision in the Robinson-Patman Act that prohibits buyers from inducing or receiving discriminatory allowances or services. However, the
Federal Trade Commission may issue cease and desist orders against
such practices under section five of the Federal Trade Commission
22 0
Act.
The Robinson-Patman Act is a highly controversial statute. Its
proponents regard it as providing essential protection for small business
against the power of large sellers and buyers. Opponents regard the
"'Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323,
"'Act of June 19, 1936, ch. 592,

§ 2, 38 Stat. 730.
§§ 2(a)-(f), 49 Stat.

1526. The 1936 enactment which amended

§ 2 of the Clayton Act, now 15 U.S.C. §8 13(a)-(f), also added three sections, now 15 U.S.C.
§§

13a, b, 21a (1970). Selections from the voluminous bibliography on the Robinson-Patman Act

are: C. AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN
ACT (2d ed. 1959); C. EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW (1959); S. OPPENHEIM & G.
WVESTON, ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (1971)(4 volumes); W. PATMAN, COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (1963); F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN

ACT (1962), Supp. 1964); H. TAGGART, COST JUSTIFICATION (1959).
21915 U.S.C. §§ 13(a)-(f) (1970).

2FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 41(1968), noted in 47 N.C.L. REv. 24.3 (1969).
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statute as providing too rigid control with unintended anticompetitive
effects. 2"' Notwithstanding many amendatory efforts, it has been
amended only once. 22 Although the Department of Justice may enforce
this Act, primary responsibility for public enforcement is left to the
Federal Trade Commission. Private enforcement via treble damage suits
is extensive. Although the outer limits of the jurisdictional sweep of the
Robinson-Patman Act are yet to be defined by the United States Supreme Court, decided cases nevertheless reveal that the Act is far reaching. In Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co.,223 the United States Supreme
Court sustained a section 2(a) treble-damage suit against a New Mexico
bakery for a discriminatory reduction of its wholesale bread prices in a
single New Mexico town where it had competition with plaintiff. The
defendant had not reduced its prices elsewhere, including a Texas community served with a bread truck operating out of New Mexico. The
Court reasoned that the price cut directed at plaintiff, defendant's competitor, was supported by an interstate "treasury." Recently, the United
States Supreme Court declined to review a decision of a lower court in
which it was held that when all of the activities are in a single state, there
is no jurisdiction under the Robinson-Patman Act.224
V.

UNFAIR COMPETITION,

UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPETITION, AND

UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES

In 1969 the General Assembly made a significant addition to chapter 75 by enacting section 75-1.1 which is set forth in full below:
(a)Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared
2"Recently recommendations have been made to repeal or make important changes in the
Robinson-Patman Act. A summary of the recommendations of the White House Task Force
Report on Antitrust Policy and the President's Task Force Report on Productivity and
Competition is contained in HOUSE SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS AND THE ROBINSONPATMAN ACT TO THE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, SMALL BUSINESS AND TE ROBINSON-

PATMAN ACT, H.R. REP., 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Extensive hearings were held by this special
subcommittee. Hearings on H. Res. 66 Before the Special Subcomm. on Small Business and the
Robinson-PatmanAct of the House Select Comm, on Small Business, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., vols.

1,2 (1970).
2u Act of May 26, 1938, ch. 283, 52 Stat. 446, now 15 U.S.C. § 13c (1970) provides that the
Act shall not apply to purchases of supplies for their own use by schools, colleges, universities,
public libraries, churches, hospitals, and charitable institutions.
=348 U.S. 115 (1954).
2

mAbramson v. Colonial Oil Co., 390 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 831 (1968).
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unlawful.
(b)The purpose of this section is to declare, and to provide .civil
legal means to maintain, ethical standards of dealings between persons
engaged in business, and between persons engaged in business and the
consuming public within this State, to the end that good faith and fair
dealings between buyers and sellers at all levels of commerce be had in
this State.
(c)Nothing in this ection shall apply to acts done by the publisher,
owner, agent, or employee of a newspaper, periodical or radio or television station, or other advertising medium in the publication or dissemination of an advertisement, when the owner, agent or employee did not
have knowledge of the false, misleading or deceptive character of the
advertisement and when the newspaper, periodical or radio or television station, or other advertising medium did not have a direct financial
interest in the sale or distribution of the advertised product or service.
(d)Any party claiming to be exempt from the provisions of this
section shall have the burden of proof with respect to such claim.2
The first sentence, section 75-1. 1(a), is borrowed from section five of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. 22 However, subsections (b), (c), and (d)
are not derived from the federal law.
Prior to 1969 the General Assembly enacted in piece-meal fashion
legislation designed to protect competitors and consumers from unfair
trade practices. For example, in 1957 the General Assembly adopted an
elaborate scheme to control unfair trade practices in the diamond industry.2 27 This special statute drew upon section five of the Federal Trade
Commission Act by defining an unfair trade practice as "unfair methods of competition, unfair or deceptive acts or practices and other illegal
practices which are prohibited by law." 228
The General Assembly has charged the Commissioner of Agriculture with extensive duties in the area of unfair trade practices. He administers the law of weights and measures; 229 he is charged with responsibility to establish rules and regulations designed to protect producers of
fruits and vegetables against unfair trade practices;210 and he is required
n2N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (Supp. 1971).
-15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970). See note 8 supra.
-Ch. 585, §§ 1-3, [1957] N.C. Sess. L. 523, codified at N.C. GEN.

(1965) (a criminal provision).
2N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-73(4) (1965).
m-d.§ 81-2.
2Id. § 106-496 (Supp. 1971).

STAT.

§§ 66-73 to -75
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to report the existence of fertilizer trusts to solicitors and to the General
Assembly."' The foregoing are but a few illustrations of the duties of
the Commissioner of Agriculture to protect the public.? 2 Statutes dealing with trademarks and brand names to supplement the common law
provide another illustration of legislative control of unfair trade practices.?
Apart from legislation, the courts of North Carolina have applied
the common law in dealing with deceitful practices.2: Misrepresentation
and a variety of other business practices have been frowned upon by the
judiciary under the common law of unfair competition.?' A brief summary of the common law of unfair competition is necessary in order to
show its relationship with section 75-1.1
A.

Unfair Competition

The concept of unfair competition had its origin in the sense of
justice of common law judges. The North Carolina Supreme Court
defines unfair competition as that "'which a court of equity would
consider unfair.' "23 Trademark and trade name infringement provided
a fruitful setting for the early development of the law of unfair competition.?7 A businessman might "pass off" his goods as those of a competitor by using an identical or confusingly similar mark. This practice came
to be regarded as unfair competition. Other practices have been added
to a growing list. A recent study of the law of unfair competition in
North Carolina discusses the following topics: trademark and trade
name infringement; imitation of a competitor's product and its
appearance; interference with a competitor's contractual relations; disparagement of product; title or business methods; and misappropriation
-IJd. § 106-22(2) (1966).
'21See generally id. ch. 106 (1966), as amended, (Supp. 1971) for other responsibilities of the
Commissioner of Agriculture.
21ld. §§ 80-1 to -14 (Supp. 1971). Civil remedies provided include profits, damages, and
penalties. Id. § 80-12.
2"[rwin v. Sherril, I N.C. 99 (1799).
2'Yellow Cab Co. v. Creasman, 185 N.C. 551, 117 S.E. 787 (1923), noted in 2 N.C.L. REV.

54 (1923).
2uCharcoal Steak House, Inc. v. Staley, 263 N.C. 199, 204, 139 S.E.2d 185, 189 (1964),
quotingCarolina Aniline & Extract Co. v. Ray, 221 N.C. 269, 20 S.E.2d 59 (1942).
2"See R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS, AND MONOPOLIES
(3d ed. 1967, Supp. 1971)(5 vols.); S. OPPENHEIM, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES (2d ed. 1965, Supp.
1969).
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of a competitor's values.23 Since the time when this study was made, a
case involving the doctrine of misappropriation of a competitor's values
has been decided. In Libertyl UA. Inc. v. Eastern Tape Corp.,239 decided
by the Court of Appeals of North Carolina in 1971, defendants were

restrained from copying plaintiff's uncopyrighted records on tapes
through an electronic device and then selling the tapes in competition
with plaintiff's records. The North Carolina court followed the reasoning of InternationalNews Service v. Associated Press,4 ° decided by the
United States Supreme Court in 1918, in concluding that it is unfair

competition for defendant "to reap where he has not sown." Thus, the
common law of unfair competition in North Carolina extends beyond

the traditional concept of "passing off." This brief summary provides
a context in which to explore the question of the relationship of this body

of law to the substantive provisions of section 75-1.1. First, consideration will be given to the phrase "unfair methods of competition."
B.

Unfair Methods of Competition
In 1914 Congress created the Federal Trade Commission and gave

it jurisdiction over "unfair methods of competition in commerce." 1
Congress deliberately avoided the phrase "unfair competition" and
chose instead the phrase "unfair methods of competition" because it

wanted to provide a broader and more flexible phrase the meaning of
which would be formulated by a process of judicial inclusion and exclu-

sion.2 12 Put another way, Congress did not want to confine the Federal
Trade Commission to the common law of unfair competition. Instead,
it chose to permit the Commission, subject to approval by the federal

courts, to develop a body of law under the new concept of "unfair
W'Comment, Unfair Competition-Lawof Unfair Competition in North Carolina,46 N.C.L.
REv. 856 (1968).
'MII N.C. App. 20, 180 S.E.2d 414, cert. denied, 278 N.C. 702 (1971). The North Carolina
Court of Appeals did not think that decisions of the United States Supreme Court holding that
the copying of unpatented products is permissible despite any state laws to the contrary applied in
this situation. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1965); Compco Corp. v. DayBrite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-28 (1965) eliminates any common
law right to restrict the use of a recording sold for use in this state. This, of course, is not the same
as to permit it to be copied on tape and sold in competition with the record.
An effort to make tape "piracy" a criminal offense failed in the 1971 General Assembly.
Raleigh News and Observer, June 23, 1971, at 6, col. 7.
240248 U.S. 215 (1918).
24
Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717, presently codified at 15 U.S.C. § § 41-51 (1970).
12 FTC v. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
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methods of competition." The multitude of cases involving "unfair
methods of competition" reveal beyond doubt that this phrase has a
substantive reach far beyond the common law of unfair competition in
North Carolina. 2 3 Inasmuch as section 75-1.1 adopts the language
"unfair methods of competition," it should follow that practices heretofore deemed unfair competition under the common law of North Carolina should now be a violation of section 75-1.1 as an unfair method of
competition. The effect of proceeding under the statute rather than under
the common law would provide for public enforcement, and a private
litigant could sue for treble damages.. Thus in Libertyl UA, Inc. v. Eastern Tape Corp., 44 plaintiff by bringing his case under section 75-1.1
could sue for treble damages in addition to seeking injunctive relief.24
Further, the Attorney General should now be authorized to investigate
and to bring civil actions in the name of the state to stop practices which
violate the North Carolina law of unfair competition.246 An injured party
is permitted to utilize the fruits of the investigation conducted by the
Attorney General in a suit for treble damages. 247
A limitation imposed on the phrase "unfair methods of competition" by the federal courts will, no doubt, influence the North Carolina
courts in interpreting the same provision. In FTC v. Raladam Co., 28 the
United States Supreme Court decided that proof of injury to competition was a jurisdictional prerequisite to a proceeding charging "unfair
methods of competition." The impact of this limitation was to foreclose
the Federal Trade Commission from utilizing this provision to attack a
practice engaged in by all competitors. More importantly, the Commission was barred from protecting consumers directly from unfair trade
practices. As a consequence of this decision, Congress in 1938 passed the
Wheeler-Lea Amendment249 to section five of the Federal Trade Commission Act. This amendment, now embodied in section 75-1.1 of the
'1See FTC v. Texaco Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968); FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968);

FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC,
312 U.S. 457 (1941).
"1 I N.C. App. 20, cert. denied, 278 N.C. 702 (1971).
24In 1971 Congress amended the copyright law to provide for limited copyright of sound
recordings. Pub. L. No. 92-140 (Oct. 15, 197 1), amending 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
2"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-9, -10, -12, -14, -15 (1965), as amended, (Supp. 197 1).
- 4 Id. §§ 75-9,-10,-16 (Supp. 1971).

-283 U.S. 643 (1931).
A'Act of March 21, 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111, now embodied in 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)

(1970).
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North Carolina law, gave the Federal Trade Commission jurisdiction
over "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" in commerce. Inasmuch as
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices" is a broader prohibition than
"unfair methods of competition," judicial development in North Carolina will probably be centered on it rather than on the more limited
phrase "unfair methods of competition."'
C. Unfair'orDpceptive Acts or Practicesin the Conduct of Any Trade
or Commerce
This provision2 0 is sufficiently comprehensive to include the common law of unfair competition and unfair methods of competition. Since
it covers unfair trade practices, it will protect competitors as well as
consumers from such practices. Thus it may prove to be the most important single provision in chapter 75.
Certain deficiencies in other sections of chapter 75 can be corrected
by use of this unfair trade practice provision. For example, in Rice v.
Asheville Ice Co.,2 plaintiff, a retailer of ice, sued for damages under
seciton 75-5(b)(3), alleging that defendants, wholesalers of ice, had refused to sell to him. The North Carolina Supreme Court concluded that
plaintiff was not a competitor or rival in business with either of defendants and dismissed the action. Today, however, the plaintiff could sue
on the theory that the defendants were engaged in an unfair trade practice, and his suit could proceed to the merits without proof that he was
a competitor of the plaintiffs. Although the North Carolina Supreme
Court has held that the service of transporting gasoline is a "thing of
value" and hence within the definition of "goods" in section 755(a)(2), 2 2 it is not yet firmly established that all -service industries are
covered by the seven subsections of section 75-5(b). Until this doubt is
resolved, a safer course to follow when dealing with a service industry is
to include a charge of an unfair trade practice under section 75-1.1.
Section IV, D, (2) of this article discusses the serious deficiency of the
law in North Carolina in coping with concerted refusals to deal. By
following the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Fashion
r-N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (Supp. 1971).
=1204 N.C. 768, 169 S.E. 707 (1933). Defendants were also retailers of ice but this fact was
ignored by the court.
2"Bennett v. Southern Ry., 211 N.C. 474, 191 S.E. 240 (1937).
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Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC,13 which interpreted section
five of the Federal Trade Commission Act to outlaw concerted refusals
to deal, the situation in North Carolina could be rectified by applying
section 75-1.1.
Apart from providing supplementary legislation for the restraint of
trade provisions of chapter 75, the major thrust of the unfair trade
practices provision is to provide extensive protection to consumers. Unlike most. federal regulatory legislation, including the Sherman and the
Clayton Acts, section five of the Federal Trade Commission Act is
limited to acts in interstate commerce and does not extend to acts affecting interstate commerce.2- Consequently, there is a vast area of exclusive
jurisdiction for application of section 75-1.1. A Consumer Protection
Division has been established in the Department of Justice. 5 The Attorney General has stated that he hopes to be able to "draw upon many of
the decisions rendered pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission Act
in enforcing the North Carolina counterpart." 6 This body of law is too
extensive to summarize.2 7 However, a few illustrative examples reveal
the type of practices that the Federal Trade Commission has sought to
discourage through cease and desist orders pursuant to section five of
the Federal Trade Commission Act:
(1) The use of false or misleading advertising concerning, and the
misbranding of, commodities, respecting the materials or ingedients of
which they are composed, their quality, purity, origin, sources, attributes, or properties, or nature of manufacture, and selling them under
such names and circumstances as to deceive the public.
(2) Various schemes to create the impression that the customer is
being offered an opportunity to make purchases under unusually favorable conditions when such is not the case, such schemes including(a) Sales plans in which the seller's usual price is falsely represented as a special reduced price for a limited time or to a
limited class, or false claim of special terms, equipment, or
-312 U.S. 457 (1941).
2uFTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1941).

-See Morgan, The People's Advocate in the Marketplace-The Role of the North Carolina
Attorney General in the Field of ConsumerProtection,6 WAKE FOREST INTRA. L. REV. 1(1969).
-1d. at 20. See also Note, Consumer Protection and Unfair Competition in North Carolina-The 1969 Legislation,48 N.C.L. REV. 896 (1970).
-See generally CCH TRADE REG. REP.; R. CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS
AND MONOPOLIES (3d ed. 1967, Supp. 1971)(5 vols.); S. OPPENHEIM, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES
(2d ed. 1965, Supp. 1969).
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other privileges or advantages.

(b) The use of the "free goods" or service device to create the
impression that something is actually being thrown in without

charge, when it is fully covered by the amount exacted in the
transaction as a whole, or by services to be rendered by the
recipient.
(3) Obtaining business through undertakings not carried out, and not
intended to be carried out, and through deceptive, dishonest and oppressive devices calculated
to entrap and coerce the customer or pro5
spective customer.2
Recently, in FTC v. Sperry-Hutchinson Co.29 the Supreme Court held
that the Federal Trade Commission, in measuring the standard of fairness under section five, may consider public values beyond those "en12 0
shrined in the letter or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws.
Although treble damages are available to victims of unfair trade
practices,"' the amount involved is often too small to result in a private
suit. The civil remedies available to the Consumer Protection Division
of the Department of Justice provide the most effective means to cope
with unfair trade practices. In many situations the Attorney General has
stopped unfair trade practices'by the use of a "Voluntary Assurance of
Compliance." This is a contract entered into by the Attorney General
and a business operation if the business operation is considered sufficiently responsible to honor its contractual obligations. In the agreement
the Attorney General agrees not to take court action to terminate a
practice alleged to be unfair or deceptive, and the business operation,
without admitting the commission of an unfair or deceptive act or practice, agrees to discontinue the specified activity. When necessary, a tem2 2
porary restraining order or a permanent injunction may be sought. 1
The enactment of section 75-1.1 and other consumer legislation,
together with the active role of the Consumer Protection Division in
enforcement, makes it abundantly clear that the old rule of caveat emptor is rapidly being replaced by a new admonition--caveat vendor !22
='1943 FTC ANN. REP. 49-56.
-14 0 U.S.L.W. 4241

(U.S. March 1, 1972).

Mid. at 4244.
2N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (Supp. 1971).
2

'fhis description is taken from an address by North Carolina Attorney General Robert

Morgan, The States' Roles in Consumer Protection,Conference on Consumer Legislation, New

Orleans, La., Oct. 29, 1971.
20See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-27 (Supp. 1971) (unsolicited merchandise through the mail); id.
ch. 25A (Retail Installment Sales Act); id. § 14-291.2 (pyramid and chain schemes prohibited);
id. §§ 143-144 to -151.1 (Uniform Standards Code for Mobile Homes).
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CONCLUSION

Concentration of economic power in the hands of a few occurs
today not through the trust arrangement but primarily through mergers
of various types-horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate. The Federal
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission undertake to
prevent mergers that violate section seven of the Clayton Act and the
Sherman Act. 64 The foregoing analysis of chapter 75 does not reveal any
effort to prevent mergers under North Carolina law. As a practical
matter the responsibility to prevent undue concentration of economic
power must remain largely that of the federal government. On the other
hand, there is need for the states to take an active role in insuring
adherence to the rules of the game of competition by protecting competitors and consumers from unfair practices. Heretofore, enforcement of
the North Carolina statutes dealing with restraints of trade has been
meager compared to federal enforcement of similar federal statutes.
Recently, however, the Attorney General of North Carolina began to
take an active role in the enforcement of the new unfair trade practice
provisions265 as well as the historical restraint of trade prohibitions set
forth in chapter 75.66
Public enforcement of the unfair trade practice provisions in section
75-1.1 is by injunctive relief,267 whereas both criminal and injunctive
remedies are available for enforcement of the restraint of trade provisions in sections 75-1 and 75-5 and some of the other provisions in
chapter 75.268 Further, in 1969 the Attorney General was given broad
2"These two agencies of the federal government filed ninety two anti-merger suits during the

four year period from June 30, 1966 to June 30, 1970. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MERGER
CASE DIGEST vii (1971). See generally S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS
ch. 8 (3d ed. 1968, Supp. 1970).
2"For example, suit was instituted against several individuals to restrain them from using the

name "Unclaimed Freight" to describe a company which apparently never sold merchandise fitting
that description but used the name to lure unsuspecting customers into a place of business where

"bait and switch" was a standard operating procedure. Address by North Carolina Attorney
General Robert Morgan, supra note 260.
2'Several defendants where charged under N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§ 75-1 (1965) for conspiring to

foreclose competition in telephone construction work and telephone installation work by fixing
prices to eliminate competition and by cancelling contracts which were competitively entered into.
They pleaded nolo contendere. Individual defendants were fined 1,500 dollars each and given
suspended jail sentences. The corporate defendant was fined five thousand dollars. State v. Pyramid

Constr. Co., No. 68-190 (Buncombe County, N.C. Super. Ct. 1968).

n 7N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-14 (Supp. 1971).
STrhe criminal provisions in chapter 75 appear in the following sections: § 75-6, § 75-7, § 758, § 7519 and § 75-28. Each of these sections is set forth in the appendix.
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authority to protect consumer interests before various state regulatory
agencies .269
Private litigants may bring treble damage suits for violation of any
provision in chapter 75,27 but injunctive relief is not available to them
to enforce any of the criminal provisions of that chapter.2 71 However,

since section 75-1.1 is not a criminal statute, there appears to be no bar
to a suit for injunction brought by a victim of an unfair trade practice

proscribed by that section.
n"N.C. GEN. STAT.

§

114-2 (8)a (Supp. 1971).

21°N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (Supp. 1971). In Union County plaintiffs were awarded treble
damages under this statute in a suit in which the defendant was charged with misrepresenting the
size of a lot, several essential features of a house, and the warranty that plaintiffs would receive
upon the purchase of the house and lot. Address by North Carolina Attorney General Robert
Morgan, supra note 260. The seller of an automobile was found guilty of turning back the mileage
register of a used car. The buyer was awarded treble damages. Raleigh News and Observer, Apr.
8, 1972, at 7, col. 5.
2'Carolina Motor Serv., Inc. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 210 N.C. 36, 185 S.E. 479 (1936).
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APPENDIX: CHAPTER752

§ 75-1. Combinations in restraint of trade illegal.-Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce in the State of North Carolina
is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person or corporation who shall make any such contract
expressly or shall knowingly be a party thereto by implication, or who shall engage in any such
combination or conspiracy, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof such
person shall be fined or imprisoned, or both, in the discretion of the court, whether such person
entered into such contract individually or as an agent representing a corporation, and such corporation shall be fined in the discretion of the court not less than one thousand dollars.
§ 75-1.1. Methods of competition, acts and practices regulated; legislative policy.-(a) Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade
or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.
(b) The purpose of this section is to declare, and to provide civil legal means to maintain,
ethical standards of dealings between persons engaged in business, and between persons engaged in
business and the consuming public within this State, to the end that good faith and fair dealings
between buyers and sellers at all levels of commerce be had in this State.
(c) Nothing in this section shall apply to acts done by the publisher, owner, agent, or employee
of a newspaper, periodical or radio or television station, or other advertising medium in the
publication or dissemination of an advertisement, when the owner, agent or employee did not have
knowledge of the false, misleading or deceptive character of the advertisement and when the newspaper, periodical or radio or television station, or other advertising medium did not have a direct
financial interest in the sale or distribution of the advertised product or service.
(d) Any party claiming to be exempt from the provisions of this section shall have the burden
of proof with respect to such claim.
§ 75-2. Any restraint in violation of common law included.-Any act, contract, combination
in the form of trust, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce which violates the principles
of the common law is hereby declared to be in violation of § 75-1.
§ 75-3: Repealed by Session Laws 1961, c. 1153.
§ 75-4. Contracts to be in writing.-No contract or agreement hereafter made, limiting the
rights of any person to do business anywhere in the State of North Carolina shall be enforceable
unless such agreement is in writing duly signed by the party who agrees not to enter into any such
business within such territory: Provided, nothing herein shall be construed to legalize any contract
or agreement not to enter into business in the State of North Carolina, or at any point in the State
of North Carolina, which contract is now illegal, or which contract is made illegal by any other
section of this chapter.
§ 75-5. Particular acts prohibited.-(a) As used in this section:
(1) "Person" includes any person, partnership, association or corporation;
(2) "Goods" include goods, wares, merchandise, articles or other things of value.
(b) In addition to the other acts declared unlawful by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person
directly or indirectly to do, or to have any contract express or knowingly implied to do, any of the
following acts:
(I) To agree or conspire with any other person to put down or keep down the price of
any goods produced in this State by the labor of others which goods the person intends,
plans or desires to buy.
(2) To sell any goods in this State upon condition that the purchaser thereof shall not
deal in the goods of a competitor or rival in the business of the person making such sales.
27
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(3) To willfully destroy or injure, or undertake to destroy or injure, the business of any
competitor or business rival in this State with the purpose of attempting to fix the price
of any goods when the competition is removed.
(4) While engaged in buying or selling any goods within the State, through himself or
together with or through any allied, subsidiary or dependent person, to injure or destroy
or undertake to injure or destroy the business of any rival or competitor, by unreasonably
raising the price of any goods bought or by unreasonably lowering the price of any goods
sold with the purpose of increasing the profit on the business when such rival or competitor is driven out of business, or his business is injured.
(5) While engaged in dealing in goods within this State, at a place where there is
competition, to sell such goods at a price lower than is charged by such person for the
same thing at another place, when there is not good and sufficient reason on account of
transportation or the expense of doing business for charging less at the one place than
at the other, or to give away such goods, with a view to injuring the business of another.
(6) While engaged in buying or selling any goods in this State, to have any agreement
or understanding, express or implied, with any other person not to buy or sell such goods
within certain territorial limits within the State, with the intention of preventing competition in selling or to fix the price or prevent competition in buying such goods within these
limits.
(7) Except as may be otherwise provided by article 10 of chapter 66, entitled "Fair
Trade", while engaged in buying or selling any goods in this State to make, enter into,
execute or carry out any contract, obligation or agreement of any kind by which the
parties thereto or any two or more of them bind themselves not to sell or dispose of any
goods or any article of trade, use or consumption, below a common standard figure, or
fixed value, or establish or settle the price of such goods between them, or between
themselves and others, at a fixed or graduated figure, so as directly or indirectly to
preclude a free and unrestricted competition among themselves, or any purchasers or
consumers in the sale of such goods.
(c) Nothing herein shall be construed to make it illegal for an agent to represent more than
one principal, but this provision shall not be deemed to authorize two or more principals to employ
a common agent for the purpose of suppressing cmpetition or preventing the lowering of prices.
(d) This section does not make it illegal for a person to sell his business and good will to a
competitor, and agree in writing not to enter business in competition with the purchaser in a limited
territory if such agreement does not violate the principles of the common law against trusts and
does not otherwise violate the provisions of this chapter.
§ 75-6. Violation a misdemeanor; punishment.-Any corporation, either as agent or principal, violating any of the provisions of § 75-5 shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and such corporation shall upon conviction be fined not less than one thousand dollars for each and every offense,
and any person, whether acting for himself or as officer of any corporation or as agent of any
corporation or persons violating any of the provisions of this chapter, with the exception of [§] 751.1 (the violation of which does not constitute a crime), shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon
conviction shall be fined or imprisoned, or both, in the discretion of the court.
§ 75-7. Persons encouraging violation guilty.-Any person, being either within or without the
State, who encourages or willfully allows or permits any agent or associates in business in this State,
to violate any of the provisions of this chapter, with the exception of [§] 75-1.1 (the violation of
which does not constitute a crime), shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be
punished as provided in § 75-6.
§ 75-8. Continuous violations separate offenses.-Where the things prohibited in this chapter
are continuous, then in such event, after the first violation of any of the provisions hereof, each
week that the violation of such provision shall continue shall be a separate offense.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

§ 75-9. Duty of Attorney General to investigate.-The Attorney General of the State of
North Carolina shall have power, and it shall be his duty, to investigate, from time to time, the
affairs of all corporations or persons doing business in this State, which are or may be embraced
within the meaning of the statutes of this State defining and denouncing trusts and combinations
against trade and commerce, or which he shall be of opinion are so embraced, and all other
corporations or persons in North Carolina doing business in violation of law; and all other corporations of every character engaged in this State in the business of transporting property or passengers,
or transmitting messages, and all other public service corporations of any kind or nature whatever
which are doing business in the State for hire. Such investigation shall be with a view of ascertaining
whether the law or any rule of the Utilities Commission or Commission of Banks is being or has
been violated by any such corporation, officers or agents or employees thereof, and if so, in what
respect, with the purpose of acquiring such information as may be necessary to enable him to
prosecute any such corporation, its agents, officers and employees for crime, or prosecute civil
actions against them if he discovers they are liable and should be prosecuted.
§ 75-10. Power to compel examination.-In performing the duty required in § 75-9, the
Attorney General shall have power, at any and all times, to require the officers, agents or employees
of any such corporation or business, and all other persons having knowledge with respect to the
matters and affairs of such corporations or businesses, to submit themselves to examination by him,
and produce for his inspection any of the books and papers of any such corporations or businesses,
or which are in any way connected with the business thereof; and the Attorney General is hereby
given the right to administer oath to any person whom he may desire to examine. He shall also, if
it may become necessary, have a right to apply to any justice or judge of the appellate or superior
court divisions, after five days' notice of such application, for an order on any such person or
corporatioi he may desire to examine to appear and subject himself or itself to such examination,
and disobedience of such order shall constitute contempt, and shall be punishable as in other cases
of disobedience of a proper order of such judge.
§ 75-11. Person examined exempt from prosecution.-No natural person examined, as provided in [§] 75-10, shall be subject to indictment, criminal prosecution, criminal punishment or
criminal penalty by reason of or on account of anything disclosed by him upon examination, and
full immunity from criminal prosecution and criminal punishment by reason of or on account of
anything so disclosed is hereby extended to all natural persons so examined. The immunity herein
granted shall not apply to civil actions instituted pursuant to this chapter.
§ 75-12. Refusal to furnish information; false swearing.-Any corporation or person unlawfully refusing or willfully neglecting to furnish the information required by this chapter, when it is
demanded as herein provided, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and fined not less than one thousand
dollars: Provided, that if any corporation or person shall in writing notify the Attorney General
that it objects to the time or place designated by him for the examination or inspection provided
for in this chapter, it shall be his duty to apply to a justice or judge of the appellate or superior
court division, who shall fix an appropriate time and place for such examination or inspection, and
such corporation or person shall, in such event, be guilty under this section only in the event of its
failure, refusal or neglect to appear at the time and place so fixed by the judge and furnish the
information required by this chapter. False swearing by any person examined under the provisions
of this chapter shall constitute perjury, and the person guilty of it shall be punishable as in other
cases of perjury.
§ 75-13. Criminal prosecution; solicitors to assist; expenses.-The Attorney General in
carrying out the provisions of this chapter shall have a right to send bills of indictment before any
grand jury in any county in which it is alleged this chapter has been violated or in any adjoining
county, and may take charge of and prosecute all cases coming within the purview of chis chapter,
and shall have the power to call to his assistance in the performance of any of these duties of his
office which he may assign to them any of the solicitors in the State, who shall, upon being required
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to do so by the Attorney General, send bills of indictment and assist him in the performance of the
duties of his office.
§ 75-14. Action to obtain mandatory order.-If it shall become necessary to do so, the
Attorney General may prosecute civil actions in the name of the State on relation of the Attorney
General to obtain a mandatory order, including (but not limited to) permanent or temporary
injunctions and temporary restraining orders, to carry out the provisions of this chapter, and the
venue shall be in any county as selected by the Attorney General.
§ 75-15. Actions prosecuted by Attorney General.-It shall be the duty of the Attorney
General, upon his ascertaining that the laws have been violated by any trust or public service
corporation, so as to render it liable to prosecution in a civil action, to prosecute such action in
the name of the State, or any officer or department thereof, as provided by law, or in the name of
the State on relation of the Attorney General, and to prosecute all officers or agents or employees
of such corporations, whenever in his opinion the interests of the public require it.
§ 75-16. Civil action by person injured; treble damages.-If any person shall be injured or
the business of any person, firm or corporation shall be broken up, destroyed or injured by reason
of any act or thing done by any other person, firm or corporation in violation of the provisions of
this chapter, such person, firm or corporation so injured shall have a right of action on account of
such injury done, and in damages are assessed by a jury in such case judgment shall be rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for treble the amount fixed by the verdict.
§ 75-17. Lender may not require borrower to deal with particular insurer.-No person, firm,
or corporation engaged in lending money on the security of real or personal property, and no
trustee, director, officer, agent, employee, affiliate, or associate, of any such person, firm, or
corporation, shall either directly or indirectly require or impose as a condition precedent.
To financing the purchase of such property,
To lending money upon the security of a mortgage, deed of trust, or other security instrument,
For the renewal or extension of any such loan, mortgage, or deed of trust
For the performance of any other act in connection therewith,
that such person, firm, or corporation,
For whom such purchase is to be financed,
To whom the money is to be loaned,
For whom such extension, renewal, or other act is to be granted,
negotiate, procure, or otherwise obtain any policy of insurance or renewal, or extension thereof,
covering such property, or a security interest therein, by or through a particular insurance company,
agent, broker, or other person so specified or otherwise designated in any manner by the lenders,
or their agents or employees or affiliated or related companies.
§ 75-18. Lender may require nondiscriminatory approval of insurer.-[Although the lender
and other persons enumerated in § 75-17 may not specify or designate as a condition precedent a
particular insurance company or agent, those persons, firms, or corporations engaged in lending
money may approve the insurer selected by the borrower on a reasonable, nondiscriminatory basis,
related to the solvency of the company and the type and provisions of policy coverage.
§ 75-19. Violators subject to fine and injunction.-The superior court, on complaint by any
person that § 75-17 or 75-18 is being violated, may issue an injunction against such violation and
may fine all persons, firms, corporations, and officers, directors, trustees, agents, employees, or
affiliates of such up to two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) per person for such violation. In event of
a disregard of such injunction or other court order, the superior court shall hold such parties in
contempt and prescribe such further penalties as the court in its discretion shall so determine.
§§ 75-20 to 75-26: Reserved for future codification purposes.
§ 75-27. Unsolicited merchandise through the mail.-Unless otherwise agreed, where unsolicited goods are delivered by mail or common carrier to a person, he has a right to refuse to accept
delivery of the goods and is not bound to return such goods to the sender. If such unsolicited goods
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are addressed to and intended for the recipient, they shall be deemed a gift to the recipient, who
may use them or dispose of them in any manner without any obligation to the sender.
§ 75-28. Unauthorized disclosure of tax information; violation a misdemeanor.-Except in
accordance with proper judicial order, or as otherwise provided by law, it shall be unlawful for any
person, firm or corporation employed or engaged to prepare, or who or which prepares or undertakes to prepare, for any other person or taxpayer any tax form, report or return, to disclose,
divulge or make known in any manner or use for any purpose or in any manner other than in the
preparation of such form, report or return, without the express consent of the taxpayer or person
for whom the form or return is prepared, the name or address of the taxpayer or such other person,
the amount of income, income tax or other taxes, or any information shown on or included in such
form, report or return, or any information which may be or may have been furnished by the
taxpayer or such other person to the preparer of such form, report or return or to the person, firm
or corporation so employed or engaged.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to amend or modify the authority specified in
[chapter 105, § 105-276(6) or any statute enacted in substitution therefor.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the inspection of such forms, reports or
returns required under Subchapter I of Chapter 105 of the General Statutes in accordance with the
authority provided in [§] 105-259, or the examination of any person, books, papers, records or other
data in accordance with the authority provided in [§] 105-258.
Any person, firm or corporation, or any officer, agent, clerk, employee, or former officer or
employee, of any firm or corporation engaged or formerly engaged in the preparation of tax forms,
reports or returns for others, whether acting for himself or as agent for such corporation, who or
which shall violate the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined
or imprisoned in the discretion of the court.

